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INTRODUCTION
Theology matters for law. This is not just because many Americans
are religious, although ours is a relatively religious nation. It is also
because religious thought has played a crucial role in developing
Western political and philosophical ideology, providing a great number
of the symbols and narratives we use to talk about questions of justice,
equity, and moral progress. The United States Constitution has often
been analogized to a religious document, and its promises cast as
covenantal. Religious iconography—providence, faith, renewal, and
redemption—is thus an attractive way of describing the process of
American constitutional reform.
If we are going to speak theologically, however, we must be willing
to pay the piper by casting a critical eye on the lessons our religious
traditions have to teach us.
The presumption that God is
omnibenevolent—inherently just, wise, kind, and merciful—is so
pervasive as to be almost a tautology. Were God not just, God would
not be God. Yet both Jews and Christians adhere to a Bible that often
seems to portray God in a far more sinister light. The God of the
Bible—not always, but sometimes—engages in murder, sexual
violence, cruelty, and genocide.
This God behaves in ways
incompatible with basic ethical norms, including those fundamental to
Jewish and Christian religious practice. 1 This aspect of God’s character

1. I resist using the term “Judeo-Christian” in this Review because I believe it wrongfully
conflates two distinct and separate religious traditions. Jews do not recognize the legitimacy of
the foundational Christian text, the New Testament, and Christians ascribe limited (if any) weight
to Jewish Talmudic authority, which is an essential part of Jewish theology. Because Christians
vastly outnumber Jews, the upshot tends to be a marked absence of the “Judeo-” in “JudeoChristian,” which instead almost invariably refers to a particular orthodox Christian perspective
which may or may not have anything in common with current Jewish practice.
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is perpetually marginalized, downplayed, or outright rewritten to fit
within a conventional narrative that cannot contemplate any ambiguity
in God’s moral character. Professor Robert A. Burt’s In the Whirlwind:
God and Humanity in Conflict 2 is an effort to get back to God’s roots—
an unflinching and unapologetic look at how God is presented in the
Bible and how humans and God together manage and mediate a
relationship that is constantly under stress due to shortcomings on both
sides. More than a theological account, though, Burt also presents his
take on the “political theory” of the Bible—one that shies away from
perfect justice in favor of maintaining a healthy dynamic within a polity
that is presumably invested in its perpetuation. Burt extends this
observation to constitutional law, which also gains its force not from an
absolute right to claim obedience, but rather from the relational standing
by which American citizens come into contact with the Constitution.
Our faith in the Constitution, like our faith in God, cannot be predicated
on the idea that these sovereigns are always behaving in a perfectly just
manner—even as that very belief tries to ingrain itself inside us again
and again, rooting out dissent and dissensus. Rather, our relation exists
because we find it meaningful even in spite of persistent, mutual
failings—failings that we should try to correct. A faithful theological
and constitutional relationship is a relationship that will see
considerable protest; that protest is an expression of commitment, not
apostasy.
This Review proceeds in three parts. Part I summarizes Burt’s
essential argument regarding God’s presentation in the Bible, and its
implications for modern political and legal theory. 3 God is continually
presented as neither infallible nor perfect, but rather as flawed and
vulnerable. God desires a genuine relationship with humankind, but is
unsure of his ability to maintain it and often times seems to break his
end of the bargain. The story of the Bible is not one of God setting out
an ideal of perfect behavior that humankind perpetually falls short of

2. ROBERT A. BURT, IN THE WHIRLWIND: GOD AND HUMANITY IN CONFLICT (2012). Future
citations to this book are placed in the text of this Review.
3. Though Burt includes chapters about the New Testament and Jesus, I focus exclusively on
his explication of the Tanakh for several reasons. First, my approach is a Jewish one and relies
heavily on Jewish theological literature, such as the Talmud, which is not appropriately applied to
Christian texts. Second, not being Christian and having no independent expertise in Christianity,
I do not feel qualified to opine on the accuracy of Burt’s account vis-à-vis Christian scriptures;
since I dislike when Christians instruct Jews on what Judaism “really” is or means, I will refrain
from doing the same to them. Third, grouping the New Testament as relevant commentary on the
Tanakh is a fundamentally Christian way of looking at things, as Jews don’t accord the former as
having any authoritative bearing on the latter. Hence, using it even as an interpretative gloss
would simply muddy already unclear waters.
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meeting. Rather, it is a story of two parties who both sincerely desire a
full, fruitful, and meaningful relationship, but who both sometimes fail
to do their part. As a matter of political theory, Burt suggests that the
Bible counsels a focus less on the achievement of “perfect justice,” and
more on the constitutive effects of maintaining a relationship of
meaning—a covenantal relationship—in the face of a history of
breaches and shortcomings. The claim is not that God is inherently
malevolent; this is as false as the traditional account of God as perfectly
munificent. Rather, the claim is that, like humankind, God can behave
in a destructive or unjust manner, and the political dynamic between
God and humankind is for each to press the other into making right and
just choices. The great heroes of the Bible—such as Abraham, Moses,
and Job—are those who challenge God, and the closest we do get to
divine/mortal harmony is when both God and humankind are willing to
listen to the pleas and concerns of the other with respect.
Part II is primarily theological. It contextualizes some of Burt’s
arguments with regard to “protest theology,” a theological school that
focuses on claims humankind can make against God when God behaves
unjustly or in ways inconsistent with his promises. Burt’s methodology
is almost exclusively textualist, paying very little attention to the
(massive) literature that provides commentary and explanation of every
word and letter of the Biblical text. However, as unorthodox as Burt’s
argument may seem, it can claim to be part of a rich heritage of Jewish
theological argument. Protest theology rejects the often axiomatic
assumption that God is always good or just (eutheism). More to the
point, it holds that the eutheistic outlook not only stunts our ability to
have a true, meaningful relationship with God, but that the theological
contortions it demands also cause us to miss several important themes
and lessons latent in the Hebrew Bible. 4
Part III then explores what protest theology tells us about
constitutional law. It first observes that the Constitution seems to
occupy a similar place in America’s political imagination as God does
in our religious imagination. The Constitution is, in a real sense, a
sacred text, whose commands are more than just technical mandates and
proscriptions, but normative obligations as well. Like the God of the
Bible, it is seemingly inconceivable that the Constitution could
command evil—tolerate it, perhaps, but not require it. To be told that
one’s conduct violates, for example, the Equal Protection Clause is a

4. Protest theology has well-established roots throughout Jewish history, but it gained
particular weight in post-Holocaust Jewish theology, which, for obvious reasons, is particularly
concerned with restoring a ruptured relationship between God and humankind. See infra Part II.
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profound chastisement—more than would seem justified if the
Constitution did not have this moral authority.
And yet the Constitution, at least as interpreted by the courts,
sometimes does seem to command wrongdoing—not just permit it, but
command it. If one believes that racial integration is an incumbent
moral obligation, Parents Involved does not just permit schools to
resegregate, it forbids states from taking race-conscious action to
integrate them.5 If one believes that fetuses are human beings with full
rights and dignity, Roe v. Wade does not just permit abortion, it forbids
states from protecting the unborn. 6 In making these decisions, the
Constitution creates a sharp sense of dissonance within persons who
possess faith in the Constitution’s justness, but whose basic moral
commitments are written out of the Constitution’s protections. We trust
the Constitution as an exponent of important shared values, like “equal
protection” and “due process,” yet we sometimes find our own
conceptions of these values standing at odds with official or popular
understandings of the relevant constitutional provisions. The precarious
nature of that situation is sometimes understated by persons with too
much faith in the processes of constitutional faith—the belief that
constitutional dissidents can hold fast to dissenting views of what the
Constitution requires in the face of sustained effort to place their views
beyond the folds of America’s basic covenantal charter. Social
movement theories of constitutional change sometimes do not give due
accord for the way that the Constitution, in practice, maintains power
over us.
One can respond to this reality in several ways. One answer is to
argue that these decisions were legally wrong—the “real” Constitution
would and could not tolerate them. Another answer is to deny that these
decisions are ethically wrong—downplaying their immoral character on
the assumption that there must be some redeeming factor or justification
sanctioning a constitutional command. A third answer is that we are
wrong to believe our Constitution has or should have any moral force
whatsoever—it is a positivist document, nothing more. But the fourth
answer is to neither cede the moral terrain nor deny the potentiality of
the Constitution toward evil. Rather, it is to throw ourselves back into

5. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). If, as some pro-life advocates promote, the Fourteenth Amendment
ought properly be understood as encompassing and protecting fetuses and embryos, see, e.g.,
Basile J. Uddo, The Human Life Bill: Protecting the Unborn through Congressional Enforcement
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 27 LOY. L. REV. 1079, 1083 (1981), then the Constitution would
not just allow restrictions on abortion, but also forbid recognition of what pro-choice activists
believe to be an essential element of women’s reproductive autonomy.
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the fray of constitutional construction, engage in a constitutive project
that creates constitutional meaning, and provide alternatives. The
project has life not because bad constitutional decisions are “wrong” or
not truly faithful expositions of constitutional meaning.
The
Constitution is capable of possessing a meaning that is true, genuine,
faithful, and malignant. But this is not inevitable. Constitutional faith
is nothing more than the belief that the Constitution can be appealed to
in the language of justice—that justice is a possibility, not an
inevitability.
I. THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS: GOD IS NOT A STRANGER
Burt begins by laying out the “core claim of modern, secular Western
political theory”: “No authority, whether divine or secular, deserves
automatic obedience. All authority must justify itself by some extrinsic
standard of justice or righteousness” (p. 1). This, Burt admits, runs
counter to general theological accounts that mandate obedience to God
simply because God is God. In the Whirlwind is an attempt to argue
that this latter account is wrong, not just as a matter of secular political
theory, but as an improper reading of the Biblical texts themselves.
From there, he doubles-back on the political question, using the Bible to
approach questions of politics as questions of maintaining healthy
relationships among imperfect actors, not finding a perfect set of
principles that promises complete and timeless harmony.
A. The Theological Account
The Talmud (“oral law”) struggles over why humankind was created.
The House of Hillel and the House of Shammai debated over whether or
not it would have been better for humankind to have not been created—
with Hillel saying it was better that humankind was created, and
Shammai arguing the opposite. One can see the traps in both sides of
the argument. On the one hand, Hillel’s position implies that humans
and God are equal (else the addition of human imperfection would
obviously dilute divine perfection). On the other hand, Shammai’s
position implies that God acted in a way that was not “best” for the
universe. Ultimately (in what any scholar of the Talmud knows is quite
the upset victory) the House of Shammai prevailed—it would have been
better had humankind not been created, but now since we were created,
we should scrutinize our actions to act as justly as possible. 7

7. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, ERUBIN 13B (Jacob Neusner ed., 2011). It is an “upset” victory
because the House of Shammai’s position is almost never accepted over that of Hillel, though
both are accepted as “words of the living God.” See infra note 167.
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Burt provides another answer: God needs humans. The relationship
between humankind and God is reciprocal, because God is incomplete
and missing something without human love and care. This, in turn,
represents a transfer of power from God to humankind, for “however
much he wished for a relationship with humans, to that extent he had
ceded power to them” (p. 31). 8 Biblical narrative is a prolonged
explication of the tension between this need by God and God’s anxiety
about the weakness it implies in him. 9 Through Genesis, as Burt notes,
God seems to struggle more and more in his ability to maintain a direct
and sustained relationship with humankind (p. 91). God at times regrets
having created humankind (p. 58, citing Genesis 6:5–7), but then
reverses course and accepts that to have a relationship with persons
means accepting the possibility, even the inevitability, that they will fall
short of perfection. In the Book of Samuel, God accepts the Israelites’
desire to have a (human) king with a sense of wounded pride, telling
Samuel “it is not you they have cast aside but Me” (p. 36, quoting 1
Samuel 8:7–10).
It is hardly a novel contribution to say that humans often fall short in
their duties to God. Where Burt shines (and provokes), however, is in
his assertions that God sometimes falls short with humankind. Though
he provides a systematic defense of this thesis running through the
entire Tanakh and New Testament, this Section focuses on his
exploration of three key characters: Abraham, Moses, and Job.
1. Abraham
Abraham is generally considered the first Israelite, departing his
ancestral lands in exchange for God’s promise that he will found a great
nation—the eventual Jewish people. Nonetheless, the relationship
between Abraham and God was exceptionally fraught, with Abraham
having “good reason for mistrusting the reliability of God’s promise to
him” (p. 68). God’s promise to Abraham is specifically enacted through
his seed, yet God’s actions vis-à-vis Abraham seem explicitly aimed at

8. Rachel Adler makes a similar point in her analysis of the marital relationship between Israel
and God as portrayed in the prophets—it renders God an “injurable other” who is capable of
being hurt and wounded by humankind when humans withhold their love. Rachel Adler, The
Battered Wife of God: Violence, Law and the Feminist Critique of the Prophets, 7 S. CAL. REV.
L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 171, 191–92 (1998).
9. I deliberated for quite some time about what pronouns to use to refer to God in this Review.
On the one hand, I am in general agreement with feminist criticisms of referring to God in a
masculine form as contributing to sexist theology and implicitly justifying gender hierarchy. On
the other hand, given the protest theology model that accuses God of engaging in, among other
things, sexual violence, abuse, and rape, it feels incongruous to suddenly switch and treat God as
feminine.
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causing Abraham to question whether God’s promise will ever come to
fruition.
To be sure, Abraham is no saint. His fearfulness that God will not
truly protect him leads him to offer up Sarah as a sexual partner to
foreigners to protect his own life (in fact, he does this twice). 10 This
mistrust, however, is not groundless. God’s promise is explicitly tied to
the fate of Abraham’s descendants, and yet God deals with Abraham’s
children in a manner bordering between cavalier and cruel: Lot is, as far
as Abraham is aware, killed at Sodom (certainly God seems indifferent
to the prospect until Abraham intercedes); Ishmael is banished to the
wilderness; and Isaac is to be sacrificed. All of these events share a
commonality: “God takes a direct hand in commanding these [near]
deaths but . . . Abraham is somehow implicated in the deed” (p. 69).
Abraham accedes, albeit reluctantly, and all he receives is a
“reiterat[ion] of the promise [God] (seemingly) had already made” (p.
70)—in effect, a signal of God’s ambivalent swaying as to whether the
bond between God and humankind is worth preserving.
Abraham’s behavior is notable for the behavioral contrast—really
continuum—he displays between Sodom and Gomorrah, the
banishment of Hagar and Ishmael, and the Akedah (binding of Isaac).
When informed of the impending destruction of Sodom, where his
nephew and adopted son Lot resided, Abraham responds with
astounding boldness. He “stood yet before the Lord”—actually, God
stood before him 11—and neither cowered nor flinched. He did not
reflexively defer to God’s authority. Instead, he challenged God on the
grounds that there may be innocents in the city, and “[f]ar be it from
You to do such a thing, to put to death the innocent with the guilty,
making innocent and guilty the same. Far be it from You! Will not the
Judge of all the earth do justice?” (p. 71, quoting Genesis 18:25). A
progressive bargaining session ensues where Abraham continually
pushes the number of required innocents down, with God only
conceding precisely up to the point Abraham pushes him. With each
iteration, Abraham’s courage falters further; he is only able to talk God
down to ten before he ceases the discourse. 12 In this respect, Abraham
10. Genesis 12:13–15; 20:2.
11. See infra notes 121–24 and accompanying text for a discussion of kethib/qere, which
accounts for the divergence between the actual written text and the traditional formulation in this
context.
12. Compare Genesis 18:22–24 (“[B]ut Abraham stood yet before the LORD. And Abraham
drew near, and said, ‘Wilt thou also destroy the righteous with the wicked? Peradventure there
are fifty righteous . . . .’”); Genesis 18:27 (“Behold now, I have taken upon me to speak unto the
Lord, which am but dust and ashes . . . .”); Genesis 18:30 (“And he said, ‘Oh let not the Lord be
angry, and I will speak . . . .’”); Genesis 18:31 (“And he said, ‘Behold now, I have taken upon me
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stands up to God—only partially and falteringly, but he does it
nonetheless. If, as Burt hypothesizes, what is being “tested” here is
“whether any human being could assist [God] in balancing his own
conflicting impulses toward humanity” (p. 73), Abraham’s conduct was
at least a partial success. Abraham is cast in the role of the rainbow, “to
remind [God] of his vow to himself” (p. 73).
When Sarai 13 demands that Hagar and Ishmael be thrown out,
Abraham too protests—“the thing seemed evil in Abraham’s eyes
because of his son” (p. 76, quoting Genesis 21:11). But God contradicts
this, instructing Abraham to accede to Sarai’s wishes. Abraham did not
“stand yet before the Lord”—he complied, and his son and concubine
were cast out to what Abraham could only assume was a wandering
death (though they were in fact saved by God, Abraham did not know
this and he never saw Ishmael again) (p. 76). His initial protest having
fallen on deaf ears, he complied in silence.
The Akedah marks the end of this awful journey. Abraham is utterly
silent in the face of God’s demand that he sacrifice “your son, your only
one, whom you love, Isaac” (p. 76, quoting Genesis 22:2). He makes
no protest, in fact he says nothing at all. He has apparently given up
entirely. Abraham may well believe that Lot and Ishmael are dead (an
intuition God subtly reinforces by calling Isaac “your only one”), and
presumes that God is finally and with finality revoking his promise to
give unto him a great nation (p. 77). 14 As Abraham is about to sacrifice
Isaac, God intervenes, Abraham relents, and God promises that his seed
will be multiplied as a reward for his obedience (pp. 78–79).
And that is it. Though Abraham lived for forty years after the
Akedah, God and Abraham never speak again, and neither do Abraham
and Isaac (pp. 79–80). This silencing is itself a repeated theme in the
Bible. 15 God largely stops speaking to Jacob after their infamous
struggle (pp. 88–91), and does not speak to any of Jacob’s descendants
until the time of Moses. “In living through the actual event, Abraham’s
descendants must have felt entirely abandoned—at least those who lived
through the four centuries of slavery and affliction. If they had been
told of God’s promise to Abraham, God gave them no sign of

to speak unto the Lord . . . .’”); and Genesis 18:32 (“And he said, ‘Oh let not the Lord be angry,
and I will speak yet but this once: Peradventure ten shall be found there.’”).
13. Sarah is still known as Sarai at this point in time (p. 76).
14. Abraham is mostly silent on the journey with Isaac up until his hand is raised for the
slaughter. Abraham responds to Isaac when he asks from where the sheep will come for the
offering (albeit evasively). See Genesis 22:7–8.
15. See infra notes 154–64 and accompanying text (noting the implications of the last time
God speaks with any human in the Hebrew Bible—at the conclusion of the Book of Job).
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remembering this promise or remaining committed to it” (p. 92).
2. Moses
No character in the Hebrew Bible is as intimately close with God as
Moses. This is not through a lack of effort; something was missing
from God’s efforts with Abraham that Moses was able to achieve. But
what?
Moses’s first words in the Bible are to intervene in a fight between
two Hebrew slaves. This follows Moses slaying an Egyptian overseer
who had been beating an Israelite; the aggressor in the later brawl
replies by asking “intendest thou to kill me, as thou killedst the
Egyptian?” This revealed to Moses that Pharoah knew he killed the
Egyptian, causing Moses to flee into exile—a twist reminiscent of Cain,
but unlike Cain, Moses’s act was in pursuit of justice (pp. 96–97, citing
Exodus 2:11–15). This selfless act triggers God to re-engage with
humanity—but it is unclear that Moses is interested. Unlike his
predecessors, for whom God was acting to forgive prior wrongdoing,
Moses “did not appear to need forgiveness for any real or imagined
offense . . . . [T]he issue appeared to emerge whether God would be
forgiven by Moses for his abandonment of the children of Israel during
their four centuries of enslavement” (p. 98). Indeed, Moses makes
many demands of God—signs, wonders, and assurances—before he
agrees to serve as God’s mouthpiece. This bargaining parallels
Abraham’s intercession on behalf of Sodom and Gomorrah—in both,
claims of pious modesty cloak a rare boldness in purporting to challenge
God’s expressed will (p. 101). And it is predicated on the fact that, for
many Israelites, the God of their ancestors was nothing but a myth—
there was no reason for them to believe he had done anything but
abandon them to suffer (p. 102).
The defining element of Moses’s relationship with God is that no
man, up until that point, had been as forward, yet selfless, in making
demands of God. Moses is unafraid to standup for the Israelites, even
before God and even when Israelites are worthy of some punishment.
The climax of the narrative is Moses’s defense of the Israelite people in
the wake of their erection of the Golden Calf. God was enraged at this
display of idolatry and vowed to destroy the Israelites outright. This
facially parallels the threat to destroy Sodom and Gomorrah but, unlike
that case, God did not invite Moses’s counsel, and he certainly did not
“stand before” Moses. 16 Much the opposite, God ordered Moses to
“leave Me be, that my wrath may flare against them, and I will put an
16. See supra note 12 and infra notes 122–23 and accompanying text.
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end to them” (p. 107, quoting Exodus 32:10). But Moses did not depart,
and he did not back down. He courageously took up the mantle of his
people and urged God to “repent of this evil against Thy people.”17
Abraham was able to briefly challenge God, but only upon implicit
invitation, wrapped in pieties. Moses, by contrast, speaks plainly and
directly to God to convince him not to slay the Hebrew people. In part,
his argument is reputational—if God slays the Israelites the Egyptians
will draw the wrong message from their departure—but in part Moses is
recalling God’s own prior ambivalence and unreliability as a protector
of the Jewish people. God simply has not demonstrated the moral
credibility to be able to slay the Israelites outright and yet command
their obedience in the future (p. 108). And God responded in precisely
the terms Moses demanded—he “repented of the evil which He thought
to do unto His people.” 18
After God’s repentance, Moses comes down harshly on the Israelites,
destroying their false idols, berating Aaron for his role in the
blasphemy, and having three thousand men killed. Upon returning to
God’s presence, however, Moses threw his lot in with the Israelites.
While even at the peak of his anger God had promised to spare Moses
(who, of course, was not involved in the idolatry), Moses pleaded with
God that if he were to slay the Israelites, to “blot me out” as well
alongside them (p. 109, quoting Exodus 32:32). Though Moses is
willing to castigate the Israelites for their failings, he is not willing to
abandon them; in response to the possibility that God would obliterate
them outright, Moses offered himself up as a human shield. It was after
this that God finally was willing to speak to Moses as he had to none of
his other subjects: “face to face, as a man speaketh unto his friend.” (p.
111, quoting Exodus 33:11). From then on, Moses was able to serve as
God’s conscience, and God was willing to listen—not from any
coercion that Moses could have made, but from God’s own internal
compulsion to maintain a relationship, at least with Moses and perhaps
with the Israelites or humankind as a whole (p. 114).
As before, however, the relationship could not last. Burt concludes
his treatment of Moses by highlighting Moses’s ever-greater
estrangement from God. Like Abraham, who at first “stood before the
Lord” but eventually faltered and grew silent, Moses too was able to act
as God’s conscience briefly, but eventually this harmony fractured.
Moses grew more resentful over his role as a bearer of bad news for the
Israelites (p. 125), and by the time God officially informed Moses that
17. Exodus 32:12.
18. Exodus 32:14.
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he would not enter the Promised Land, Moses greets the news without
any acknowledgment whatsoever (p. 129). In the end, Moses was
relegated to conveying God’s threats of punishment against the
Israelites in evermore graphic detail, a task Moses felt well-equipped to
do as it doubled as an indictment by Moses against God (p. 148). While
Moses had previously been able to make appeals to God based on God’s
own image as merciful and forgiving, Moses eventually lost confidence
in this vision and instead blandly held forth a divinity who ruled by fear
and terror.
3. Job
Job, according to Burt, represents an alternate history of Moses. Like
Moses, Job enters the story as a righteous man, and is selected for his
unique role on the basis of that righteousness. Like Moses, Job appeals
to God’s conscience in the face of perceived injustice, and, like Moses,
he initially is confident that God will behave in a just manner. Unlike
Moses or any other character in the Hebrew Bible, Job does not relent,
even in the face of extreme abusive escalation by God. And unlike
Moses, Job eventually earns reconciliation and healing—a restored
relationship with God.
Job is introduced as a man “perfect and upright, and one that feared
God, and eschewed evil,” a characterization endorsed by God himself. 19
Satan challenges God, saying Job’s piety is only a product of his good
fortune, so God authorizes an ever-increasing series of afflictions upon
Job as a test, progressively stripping away his riches, health, and even
his children. While Job initially endures, rejecting his wife’s advice to
“curse God and die,” 20 he eventually breaks. In the presence of three
friends who came to comfort him, Job engages in a sustained lament
and indictment of his unfair treatment by God (pp. 150–51). Despite his
friends’ insistence that God’s actions (and thus Job’s suffering) are just,
Job does not relent. Unlike all of his predecessors, Job meets escalation
with escalation, growing “increasingly adamant” in a way not even
Moses ever dared express (p. 153). While Abraham was given implicit
leave to critique God and Moses was brave enough to make his
criticism uninvited, Job represents the first time that “God acceded to a
specific demand for accountability” by a human actor (p. 155).
God’s response was not what Job must have hoped for, at least at
first. God remained silent in the face of increasingly bold challenges
from Job, who seemed to hold himself out as God’s judge and
19. Job 1:1, 1:8.
20. Job 2:9.
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conscience (p. 155)—notably, the same role in which Moses had been
previously cast. When God finally appears at the end of the Book of
Job, he offers neither an apology nor an explanation for his conduct.
Instead, he appears “out of the whirlwind” and berates Job for having
the presumption to challenge him. God’s speech makes no mention of
justice or righteousness—it is a pure display of unfiltered divine fury.
God “parade[s] his vast power before Job,” asking Job rhetorically
whether he was present at the creation of the world, whether he has
explored its depths, and whether he can control natural forces (p. 158,
citing Job 37–39). God’s reply to Job is the longest speech God gives in
the Hebrew Bible, and yet nowhere does he respond to Job’s actual
complaint (p. 158).
In the midst of this torrent, God demands that Job engage—“One
who brings Shaddai to court should fight; he who charges a god should
speak.” 21 Job declines the invitation, however, protesting that he is
small and will not respond to God. 22 God reacts with even greater fury,
citing to great mythological beasts that he could control (p. 159, citing
Job 40:15, 40:24).
Why is God so enraged by Job? On the most superficial level, God is
aroused by Job’s temerity. Normally, such defiance could be met with
tangible punishment, but in Job’s case it was precisely this
“punishment” 23 that had yielded Job’s protest in the first place. So God
was reduced to a simple verbal display of fury. Yet as Burt points out,
both Job and God seem to make reference to a prior state of affairs in
which they had walked together in harmony. Job recalls this harmony
in lamentation of its abandonment; this memory, in turn, provides
perhaps the best explanation for why God bothers to answer Job at all
(pp. 159–61). But God’s fundamental ambivalence and insecurity
betrays him. Instead of coming back to Job in the spirit of
reconciliation, he responds to Job’s indictment by upping the ante:
“Who dares speak darkly words with no sense?” (p. 161, quoting Job
37:2).
When Job finally responds, he does so in the face of God’s full might
and fury. Job’s final speech is ambiguous, turning on several vagaries
in Hebrew language and grammar, which has allowed it to be
interpreted in ways that comfortably reestablish God’s supremacy and
Job’s defeat. Typically, Job is said to conclude by recanting. The

21. Job 40:2.
22. Job 40:4–5.
23. I have placed the word “punishment” in quotes because Job was not actually being
punished—his innocence is stipulated at the start of the Book of Job.
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Revised Standard Edition’s formulation, “I despise myself, and repent
in dust and ashes,” is a conventional translation (p. 164). But the
interpolation of “myself” is subjective; the verb nacham does not seem
to have an explicit subject (Job, Job’s condition, or God) (p. 163).
Except arguably it does; specifically, “dust and ashes” may serve as a
metonym for humanity (as was used by Abraham). The word nacham
itself is also ambiguous, with meanings ranging from “comfort” to
“abhor” to “shudder.” And so a polar opposite translation is possible,
with Job “shuddering for humankind [dust and ashes],” or even, most
explosively, “repenting of repentance.” 24 Burt chooses to accept that
the passage is ambiguous, and he forwards a translation that preserves
this ambiguity: “Therefore in dust and ashes, I withdraw.” (pp. 163–
65). 25
The Book of Job concludes with one final dramatic turnaround. After
Job completes his final speech, God turns his wrath upon Job’s friends,
who had persistently and diligently defended God against Job’s
indictment. Why? Because they “have not spoken of me the thing that
is right, as my servant Job has.” 26 Even if one believes Job did finally
recant, the only distinction between Job and his friends is that Job had
publicly expressed an indictment of God, whereas his friends had
fervently rejected it. That God finally adjudicates Job as the victor in
this dispute is “as close to an open admission of guilt from God as we
can find” (p. 167). And Job, for his part, is restored double his previous
fortune—another indicator that God feels guilt and is seeking
atonement, albeit indirectly.
B. The Political Theory of the Bible
In Burt’s account, Western political theory is primarily about “perfect
justice”—the idea that, given the right set of institutions and rules, we
can achieve a state of affairs that is perfectly fair and just, resolving in
perpetuity problems of scarcity and distribution (pp. 274–75). Because
legitimacy flows from how closely government approximates this state
of affairs, theorists assume the governors and governed start off as
perfect strangers, in a state of nature where “social relations were
constructed from nothing.” By contrast, the Bible starts with “a
memory of a broken relationship” (p. 39). The latter account presumes
24. See J. Jonathan Schraub, For the Sin We Have Committed by Theological
Rationalizations: Rescuing Job from Normative Religion, 86 SOUNDINGS 431, 450–51 (2003)
[hereinafter Schraub, For the Sin] (arguing that the dominant thread of translations “seriously
distort the Hebrew” and offering a range of alternatives).
25. A decision this Review challenges below. See infra Part II.A.2.
26. Job 42:7–8.
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that the sovereign and its subjects are in a preexisting relationship—
indeed, can barely fathom “a moment when humans stand outside
relationships” (p. 182)—but also presumes that this relationship is on
unstable ground and may founder. Given this presumption, the Bible’s
“core virtue in [its] political theory” is the “courage to transcend
disappointment and mistrust and to renew and even deepen loving
relationships” (p. 175).
If the Bible is a story about the relationship between humans and
God, it is quite a stormy one. The pervasive theme of the Hebrew Bible
is “an endless struggle by God to control humanity, and human beings
in turn sometimes resisting this control but nonetheless endlessly trying
to induce God to protect them” (p. 10). God learns quite early that he is
unable to entirely control his creation—Adam and Eve’s decision to eat
from the forbidden tree being one example—and Burt forwards the
claim that the existence of the tree itself may have been uninvited by
God and an example of primordial chaos reasserting itself (pp. 8–9).
An authoritative ordering of the relationship between subject and
sovereign—so essential to modern political theory (p. 182)—eludes
God from the earliest moments.
Nor is this entirely a result of human fallibility. Sometimes the
breach between God and humankind comes from human stubbornness,
refusing to accede to God’s will. Other times, the failure stems from
God “repudiat[ing] the previous conditions of an ordered relationship
with us, his explicit promises to us” (p. 12). As Burt elucidates, both
humans and God care about each other, but often act in ways that hurt
the other. And yet they keep on returning, thus creating a cycle: “Over
and over again, both God and humanity strive to re-enter [perfect
harmony] . . . . But again and again, in the narrative accounts of the
relationship between God and humanity, this unity is broken” (p. 15).
Sometimes the fault lies on one side, sometimes the other. But
sometimes the renewed effort emerges on one side, sometimes the
other; but the cycle persists, and “this repetitive cycle of intimacy and
withdrawal is the template for identifying the terms of the relationship
between God and mankind” (p. 140).
The inability to create or preserve this sense of perfect harmony, “a
puzzling failure, given the intensity of the wish on both sides to
succeed” (p. 15), leads Burt to conclude that a belief in divine
perfection is not at the Bible’s core. But if God is not able to promise
perfect justice, what provides the impetus for humans to keep returning?
One answer is simply God’s raw might—cowing humans into pleading
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submission as in Hobbes’s Leviathan. 27 Burt rejects this notion,
however, in part because the Leviathan needs nothing from its subjects,
it “stands outside and above political relationships; he wants nothing
from his subjects but exercises absolute authority over them” (p. 277).
God briefly gestures in this direction in Job, but eventually cannot
sustain it—it is evident that God does not want a “relationship” with
humankind predicated solely on overwhelming power. In the end, God
would prefer to have a relationship with Job—bold, confrontational,
uncompromising Job—than with his “frightened, pious Friends . . .
realiz[ing] that honest interchange was the only way that he might
obtain what he truly wanted from human beings” (p. 294).
As one would expect from a law professor forwarding a “political
theory of the Bible,” this sets up several observations Burt makes about
constitutional law and Supreme Court practice. Using Cooper v.
Aaron, 28 United States v. Nixon, 29 and Roe v. Wade 30 as his templates,
Burt contrasts the judicial self-image as possessing infinite power and
authority against the reality of a federal branch that is dependent on the
assistance of others and popular acquiescence to make meaningful
accomplishments (p. 303). In all these cases, Burt argues, the Court
through thunderous rhetoric attempted to finally resolve questions of
social justice that had sharply divided the nation. But the Court’s
insistence that its authority be respected betrayed a fundamental
insecurity—the accurate worry that its authority was being challenged
and mere assertions of its own infallibility would not be enough to
guarantee a just result. The “command-and-punish” model is of limited
utility for the Court as it is for God (p. 318).
Yet of course, the Court is not wholly impotent, and the God of the
Bible is also clearly able to exert influence on the world. Here, Burt
looks to how Eve was subjugated to Adam—not by Adam’s superior
strength, but based on her need for him. “God did not simply announce
that man shall ‘hold sway’ over woman; instead, he said ‘for your man
shall be your longing, and he shall rule over you” (p. 23, citing Genesis
3:16). Authority is legitimated by a condition of caring. It is not simply
a matter of power, but rather an internalized belief of “longing” and of
being concerned about one’s partner, his or her opinions, and the
perpetuation of the relationship. Humans obey God through the same
27. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (A.R. Walker ed., 1904). The title “Leviathan” itself is a
reference to the monstrous creature God evokes in the Book of Job as proof of his ability to
subdue even the mightiest beings. See Job 41:1–34.
28. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
29. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
30. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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process—they do so because God and humankind exist in a relationship
that is important and valued (pp. 23–26). Likewise, the Court finds its
authority in its ability to remind the American people of our deepest
values—a power that comes not from superior power, but from shared
commitments to constitutional covenantal principles. It brings about
racial equality not by battering segregationists into submission, but by
illuminating how their actions are incompatible with conscientious
commitment to our constitutional credo—a creed which even staunch
defenders of Jim Crow valued and believed in (p. 318). When the Court
tries to avoid this process and simply decree the appropriate result, it
forgets “the proposition that voluntarily offered mutual respect [is] the
only means by which the constitutional guarantee of equal justice could
be made a living reality” (p. 323).
It may seem that obedience out of care is a thin reed upon which to
rely compared to a fiated assumption that the sovereign’s will
(expressed either through God or the Supreme Court) is just. But it
makes up for that by enabling the possibility of a true relationship to
emerge. God’s quest for absolute power fails precisely because it is
carcinogenic to God’s desire for a meaningful relationship with
humans—if “he was intent on maintaining absolute power over humans,
he could do so only by having zero investment in obtaining any pleasure
from them” (p. 31). Sometimes God attempts to straddle the line, for
example, by asserting the naturality of the human/divine relationship, or
by simply commanding human love outright (p. 122). This is an effort
doomed to fail—a coerced relationship is no relationship at all. But it
also “betrays some doubt about the solidity” of the authority itself—it is
evidence that God is worried, if not frightened, at the possibility of
human abandonment and is working to prevent it (p. 30). As the Bible
progresses, God develops as a character and more deeply explores his
desire for human companionship (pp. 104–05). By the time we reach
Moses, God has found a human to whom he could speak “as a man
speaks to his fellow” (p. 106, quoting Exodus 33:11).
It is because the Bible does not adopt the starting point of
strangeness, but rather of closeness, that its inability to fashion an
authoritative order can be overcome. What makes the Bible unique is
that it is not, and in fact cannot be, “expressed as disembodied
propositions addressed to a generalized, anonymous audience. Its
conception can be depicted only in intensely engaged interactions
between God and humanity” (pp. 282–83). 31
31. Burt uses Elihu’s attempted intercession in the Book of Job as an example of the
irrelevance of a disinterested arbiter who is not enmeshed in the relational web (p. 282). Elihu is
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The heart of Burt’s Bible narrative is that both God and humans make
promises in the Bible, and both at times fail to live up to them. Yet
despite the “breach of contract,” the covenant persists. 32 In relation to
the covenant, both sides make demands, and sometimes these demands
are heard. In particular, consider the form of human challenges to God,
which are expressed as demands for God to behave justly. The premise
is that God is capable of behaving unjustly but should not, and the
human obligation is to compel (or persuade) God into choosing a more
merciful or ethical course of conduct. 33 Sometimes these efforts
succeed and sometimes they do not; just as sometimes God’s efforts to
turn humans towards more ethical conduct are heeded and sometimes
they are ignored. This perpetual failing would seem to be toxic in the
modern tradition, which anticipates that the right set of rational
propositions can eventually solve the puzzle of just distributions. But
the Bible is able to account for the “inevitable cycle of the pursuit and
unattainability of perfect justice” (p. 185) because there is more holding
together the relationship than simply the dry expectation of perfection.
The relationship between God and humankind is quite evidently not
characterized by perfect justice, but is instead permeated by continual
failings. And of course, we have experienced this same sense of failure
on questions of constitutional justice throughout our nation’s history.
The relationship between Americans and the Constitution, like that of
God and humanity, persists not because it has been theoretically
legitimated—God having the “right” to command obedience from
human subjects, the Constitution having the “right” to loyalty from “We
the people”—but rather because of a conscious and continuing choice
that this relationship remains meaningful and that each feels the need
for the other. The lack of a permanent resolution might cause perfect
strangers to give up the enterprise, but neither the Bible nor the
American Republic are conversations between strangers. What Burt
calls “the warring parties” “cannot easily walk away because of the
need each has for the other” (p. 283).

unrelated to the any other character in the Book, appearing suddenly without any previous
mention to decry the perceived misdeeds of both Job and his friends (p. 282). This oration
comprises all of chapters 32 through 37, and is entirely ignored by all the other participants—Job,
Job’s friends, and God (p. 282). Elihu is never mentioned again (p. 282).
32. See Adler, supra note 8, at 196 (noting that the covenant “endures as an attachment and a
commitment even when reciprocal contractual obligations have not been fulfilled”).
33. See Schraub, For the Sin, supra note 24, at 448 (arguing that Job presents God as the
source of both good and evil, warring within himself between these two inclinations in his
schizophrenic treatment of Job).
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II. PROTEST THEOLOGY
Burt’s argument is almost exclusively textualist, only occasionally
citing secondary source literature and almost never citing the Talmud or
other Orthodox canons of Biblical interpretation. For a project that
explicitly casts itself as an exercise in Jewish heritage, this is an
interesting choice. Traditionally, the Talmud, or oral law, has equal
weight to the Biblical text and is considered to be of equally divine
provenance. 34 Burt’s sharply textualist focus is somewhat reminiscent
of Karaite Judaism (which rejects the authority of the Talmud), even
though in the modern era, Jewish religious thought relies heavily on
Talmudic reasoning predicated on what might be considered a
“religious common-law” method. 35
As it happens, though, Burt’s argument justly lays claim to a vibrant
element of Jewish theological tradition—that of “protest theology.”36
Protest theology represents those elements of Jewish tradition where
humankind argues against divine wrongdoing. When Abraham “stood
yet before the Lord” to argue for the fate of Sodom and Gomorrah’s
innocents, that was protest. 37 When Job persisted in declaring his
righteousness and demanded that God account for his suffering, that
was protest. 38 The very name “Israel” translates to “one who wrestles
with God.” It was given to Jacob because he had “striven with God and
with men, and . . . prevailed.” 39 This Part provides an overview of that
tradition and how it relates to the similar claims that Burt forwards.

34. See Edward H. Rabin, The Evolution & Impact of Jewish Law: Foreword, 1 U.C. DAVIS J.
INT’L L. & POL’Y 49, 53 (1995) (“The Oral Law (the commentaries that explain and supplement
the Written Law) is considered to be divinely inspired, and thus equal in sanctity and dignity to
the Torah itself.”).
35. See id. at 55. Rabin explains,
Since a basic premise of Jewish law is that the Torah is the literal word of God, it
might appear that its specific rules could not be changed by mortal beings. Yet these
rules have been changed in response to pressing necessity, sometimes by interpretation
and sometimes through legal fictions. The Rabbis of the Talmudic period, and later,
derived authority for their power to interpret and supplement Torah law from a passage
in the Torah itself that authorized the judges in the future to make decisions which the
people should follow.
Id. (citing Deuteronomy 17:11). See also DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 44
(2010) (discussing how Originalists read the Constitution not as a living Constitution, but an
“unequivocal obligation . . . to follow [its] command”).
36. I am not making the claim that protest theology is the dominant strain of Jewish thinking
vis-à-vis God, only that it is a method of approach that is a legitimate and non-trivial part of
contemporary and classic Jewish practice.
37. Genesis 18:22.
38. Job 27:2–6.
39. Genesis 32:28. The story itself is ambiguous as to whether the being Jacob wrestles with
is God, an angel, or a man.
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A. The Abusing God
David Blumenthal has perhaps most aggressively formulated the
thesis that the God of the Hebrew Bible—sometimes—is an abuser.40
As Blumenthal writes,
God is abusive, but not always. God, as portrayed in our holy sources
and as experienced by humans throughout the ages, acts, from time to
time, in a manner that is so unjust that it can only be characterized by
the term “abusive.” In this mode, God allows the innocent to suffer
greatly. In this mode, God “caused” the [H]olocaust, or allowed it to
happen. 41

This claim is not made lightly—Blumenthal “tremble[d] from head to
toe to say it”—but Blumenthal relies on the sages’ teaching that “Truth
is the seal of God.” 42 In making this claim, neither Blumenthal nor I
mean to suggest that God is always or primarily malevolent (nor, for
that matter, that humankind is always perfect)—which is as false as
asserting that God is always or primarily good. But there are enough
homilies about God’s justice and mercy (and enough obvious examples
of human fallibility) that I feel no need to retread well-worn ground. It
is the claim that God—sometimes—acts in an abusive manner and—
sometimes—must be challenged and held to account that is
controversial.
Many of the most prominent examples outlined by Burt have been
discussed previously in this Review. The Akedah is one such example;
the entire Book of Job is another. But there are other instances that Burt
does not address—most notably, the repeated refrain of God engaging
in sexual abuse of Israel as punishment for Hebrew transgressions. 43
These are shocking, but they are present and they cannot be denied. In
Bar Kappara’s famous words: “[W]ere it not written, it would be
impossible to say so.” 44 In all of these cases, God is behaving as an
abuser. His actions are unjust and humans have every right to protest
against them.
1. The Akedah
The Akedah is the Hebrew name for the binding of Isaac, where God
40. See generally DAVID R. BLUMENTHAL, FACING THE ABUSING GOD: A THEOLOGY OF
PROTEST (1993).
41. Id. at 247.
42. David R. Blumenthal, Confronting the Character of God: Text and Praxis, in GOD IN THE
FRAY: A TRIBUTE TO WALTER BRUEGGEMANN 38, 47 (Tod Linafelt & Timothy K. Beal eds.,
1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
43. See infra Part II.A.3.
44. David Winston, The Book of Wisdom’s Theory of Cosmogony, 11 HIST. RELIGIONS 185,
188 (1971) (quoting Bereshith Rabba 1:5)..
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commands Abraham to sacrifice his son. It is implied that this
command is a test of Abraham’s devotion, 45 which appears to be
confirmed at the climax, where, after Abraham had bound Isaac and was
preparing to slaughter him, an angel stays his hand, saying “[F]or now I
know that thou fearest God, seeing thou hast not withheld thy son, thine
only son from me.” 46
The loyalty test serves as the justificatory scheme for the Akedah.
God is permitted to test the loyalty of his followers. Indeed, asking
then-Abram to leave his house and move to Canaan could be interpreted
as precisely that. 47 However, adopting this framework for reading the
Akedah means obscuring another, more central point—Abraham is not
being asked to perform just any loyalty test, he is being asked to
sacrifice his son. He is being asked to murder his child. This is hardly
extraneous information, and God certainly is not going to allow
Abraham to forget it. The command is, “Take now thy son, thine only
son Isaac, whom thou lovest, and get thee into the land of Moriah; and
offer him there for a burnt offering upon one of the mountains which I
will tell thee of.” 48 Burt’s narrative tellingly situates this request
alongside Abraham believing that both his nephew Lot and first son
Ishmael are dead by God’s command, rendering this threat against Isaac
more than credible.
The loyalty test is thus the wrong frame—or at least an incomplete
one—through which to view the Akedah. We must also add in the
touchstone admonition of post-Holocaust Jewish theology as articulated
by Irving Greenberg: “No statement, theological or otherwise, should be
made that would not be credible in the presence of the burning
children.” 49 Surely, if there is one statement that is incredible in the
face of burning children, it is the moral propriety of commanding (even
as a loyalty test) the slaughtering of children as a burnt offering.
Yeshayahu Leibowitz uses the Akedah to argue that “the essence of
faith [is] man’s ability to dissociate the consciousness of his standing
before God from the problems of the individual, humanity, and the
world.” 50 Leibowitz’s formulation effectively sees the Akedah as the

45. Genesis 22:1 (“And it came to pass after these things, that God did tempt Abraham . . . .”).
46. Genesis 22:12.
47. See Genesis 12:1.
48. Genesis 22:2.
49. Irving Greenberg, Cloud of Smoke, Pillar of Fire, in AUSCHWITZ: BEGINNING OF A NEW
ERA? REFLECTIONS ON THE HOLOCAUST 305, 315 (Eva Fleischner ed., 1977).
50. Yeshayahu Leibowitz, The Religious and Moral Significance of the Redemption of Israel,
in CONTEMPORARY JEWISH THEOLOGY: A READER 453, 461–62 (Elliot N. Dorff & Louis E.
Newman eds., 1999).
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apex of Abraham’s relationship with God. In contrast to Lot, whose life
(in tandem with the other residents of Sodom and Gomorrah) Abraham
argued for at length, or even Ishmael, whose banishment troubled
Abraham (though he fell silent at God’s reproach), Abraham’s silence
throughout the Akedah represents the pinnacle of faith. But as Burt
powerfully indicates, the Biblical text strongly seems to argue the
reverse. Abraham’s relationship with God grows more and more
strained through each of these events, and the Akedah represents not
ecstasy but rupture—the final nadir, the final breaking point. There is
no closeness between Abraham and God after the Akedah. There is
only silence—a deafening silence that may be the only response
possible in the face of even the prospect of burning children.
2. Book of Job
The Book of Job is perhaps the essential text for any Jewish protest
theology. The reason is that Job lays out the problem of divine evil in
stark, almost purified, terms. Job is stipulated to be blameless at the
beginning of the Book (so we can rule out justified punishment), 51 and
Job concludes, as Burt puts it, “as close to an open admission of guilt
from God as we can find” (p. 167). In the middle, Job challenges God
with relentless tenacity, escalating his rhetoric again and again until
God finally responds with overpowering force.
Because of its explosive implications, the Book of Job is subject to
(mis)translation that seeks to sap it of its heretical theme. Job is the
patient sufferer who eventually finds redemption through capitulation,
recognizing that God is divine and Job was presumptuous in thinking to
question him. 52
Downplaying verse after verse of Job’s fiery
indictment, 53 the focus instead turns to Job’s final speech after God
appears “out of a whirlwind.” Conventionally, Job backs down,
51. See infra Part II.C.3.
52. See H.L. Ginsberg, Job the Patient and Job the Impatient, in 17 SUPP. VETUS
TESTAMENTUM 88, 111 (1968) (“[God] impresses upon [Job] that he cannot expect, with his
puny mind, to understand [reality], and must not presume to ask for an explanation. And Job
admits that he was wrong in this expectation and in this demand.”); Marvin Pope, Job, in 15 THE
ANCHOR BIBLE lxxvi (2d ed. 1965) (“Given but a glimpse or a whisper of God’s power and glory
and loving care for his creation, Job realizes that he had spoken from ignorance and rashly. His
resentment and rebellious attitude disappear.”).
53. Compare the Jewish Publications Society (JPS) and King James Version (KJV)
translations of Job 13:15. The JPS quotes Job as saying “Though He slay me, yet will I trust in
Him; but I will argue my ways before Him.” Job 13:15 (Jewish Publications Society). The KJV
instead renders it as “Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him: but I will maintain mine own
ways before him.” Job 13:15 (King James). See also Schraub, For the Sin, supra note 24, at 436
(accusing “the KJV and virtually every other standard biblical interpretation” as “turning courage
and defiance into . . . sniveling submiss[ion]”).
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recognizing his smallness in the face of God and recanting his prior
denunciations.
As Burt alludes, this interpretation is, at best, questionable. It is not
immediately clear in the Hebrew text whom Job despises (himself, God,
or humankind), or indeed whether Job feels contempt, comfort, or fear.
Burt leaves this passage ambiguous and does not resolve these
seemingly essential questions. For him, it is unclear if Job ultimately
remains steadfast or, like Abraham and Moses before, falters short. I,
on the other hand, am of the opinion that Job does not falter, and
suggest that this opinion is both more textually cohesive and better fits
the Bible’s narrative thrust as laid out by Burt.
Job speaks twice in response to God’s theophany. After appearing
“out of the whirlwind” at the start of chapter 38, God proceeds to
verbally lambaste Job for seventy-one verses before demanding a
response from Job. 54 One would think Job, who had previously been so
adamant at demanding a hearing before God, would jump at the offer.
But he demurs, responding “Lo, I am small, how can I answer You?
My hand I lay on my mouth. I have spoken once, I will not reply;
twice, but I will say no more.” 55
Is this submission? It hardly seems so. In particular, the final
sentence seems too cavalier, almost whimsical, given the gravity of the
situation to be a sign of capitulation. Rather, this silence is another
form of defiance. Job had not merely been demanding that God simply
answer him, but rather was demanding a fair engagement on equal
ground—asking that God “put aside His club. Let His terror not dismay
me, then I would speak and not fear Him.” 56 God did not just ignore
this request; he actively spurned it. The totality of God’s response was
a thunderous rage meant to inspire nothing but terror and fear. Job said
he would speak if God “put aside His club.” God instead flaunted it, so
Job did not speak. 57
That Job’s response is defiant is buttressed by God’s reaction to it—
he does not take it as supplication, but instead flies into an even greater
rage. As Burt notes, God treats Job’s retort as if it “was itself a power
54. See Job 40:2 (“[H]e that reproveth God, let him answer it.”).
55. Job 40:4–5.
56. Job 9:34–35. See also Job 13:20–21 (“Only do not two things unto me: then I will not
hide myself from thee. Withdraw thine hand far from me: and let not thy dread make me
afraid.”).
57. See JACK MILES, GOD: A BIOGRAPHY 317 (1995) (describing Job’s response as “defy[ing]
the thunderer’s demand that Job comment on his thunder”). See also Schraub, For the Sin, supra
note 24, at 440–41 (“All Job asks is a fair playing field on which he can present his case and God
can present His. When . . . it is apparent that this is not to be the case, Job has nothing more to
say . . . .”).
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play” (p. 159), and escalates his already impressive verbal assault with
reference to even greater and terrifying beasts that God could subdue,
but which would presumably crush and devour Job. It is in response to
this tirade that Job delivers his second response.
It is here that Burt relies on the supposed ambiguity at the end of
Job’s remarks to forward an equally ambiguous translation (pp. 162–
63). Whether this one passage really is particularly ambiguous, though,
elides the fact that there are many other indicators in the text as to Job’s
meaning. Job’s refusal to engage was a commentary on God’s refusal
to fight fairly, substituting overwhelming power for actual
argumentation. In his second speech, he continues in this same light by
also drawing attention to God’s exclusive emphasis on power over
righteousness.
Job’s opening remark in his speech is typically rendered as, “I know
you can do all things”—a submissive act by Job, conceding his relative
smallness before the Lord. But this is qere—the true text reads as “You
know you can do all things”—a bitingly sarcastic rejoinder by Job who
is unimpressed by God’s powerful bluster which masks an inability to
actually respond to Job’s demands. 58 Job’s response, in essence, is “big
deal”—God already knows he can do all things, and Job has never
denied it. To the extent that is the only “argument” God can muster,
there is nothing left to respond to. 59 And if God, when backed into a
corner, will simply blast his way out with his admittedly superior
firepower, then we really should “shudder mortal clay” 60 and feel
naught but contempt for God.
By contrast, to end Job’s fierce defiance with meek supplication is
deeply unsatisfactory. Elie Wiesel found this prospect devastating—
Job, the “fierce rebel, the fighter who dared to face God and speak up as
a free man, abruptly bowed his head and gave in . . . . And so there was
Job, our hero, our standard bearer, a broken, defeated man. On his
knees, having surrendered unconditionally.” Wiesel was so troubled by
Job’s apparent submission that he believed that the “true ending [of Job]
was lost,” convinced that Job must have stayed upright until the end. 61
The alleged recantation also doesn’t fit with the progression we
witnessed from Abraham through Moses to Job. Abraham challenges
God briefly, yet his courage falters as he grows evermore tentative in
58. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
59. Schraub, For the Sin, supra note 24, at 441 (noting that phrasing the statement as “you
know you can do all things . . . is a direct challenge to both the bullying nature of God’s response
and to its irrelevance to the question of justice that Job has posed”).
60. MILES, supra note 57, at 428 n.324.
61. ELIE WIESEL, MESSENGERS OF GOD 231–33 (1976).
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defending the innocents of Sodom and Gomorrah, ceasing before
making the climactic argument (no innocents ought be slain alongside
the guilty) (p. 72) and effectively retreating from the field. Moses is
bolder still in standing up for the Israelites, but eventually his
relationship with God frays and he too falls silent.
Job would seem to be the idealized state—the man who was able to
maintain his integrity until the end in the face of divine injustice.62 In
fact, the Talmud teaches that Moses may have authored the Book of
Job, 63 indicating that Job is meant, perhaps, to be an idealized version
of Moses—a Moses who was able in fiction to say what he could not (or
could not consistently) when personally faced with the awesome power
of God. 64 Reading Job’s final speech as another capitulation would sap
his narrative of virtually all of its climactic force and would render him
essentially no different from Moses—quite a bit of sound and fury for
the sake of repetition. Moreover, it would obviate the meaning of the
conclusion of Job. Not only does it render bizarre God’s subsequent
admission of guilt (only after Job recants does God concede Job was
correct), but it also obscures the fact that Job gains the reconciliation
that eluded Moses. While Moses is excluded from the Promised Land,
Job regains double what he has lost and lives happily to the end of his
days. 65 Job had to have done something different from Moses to
deserve this treatment—and it is that Job did not, in fact, back down
from his function as God’s conscience.
3. Sexual Assault, Rape, and Mass Slaughter
Burt’s presentation of the “cycle” of the human-divine relationship is
a mutual desire by both to achieve “perfect harmony” that is thwarted
62. See Job 27:5–6 (“God forbid that I should justify you; till I die I will not remove mine
integrity from me. My righteousness I hold fast, and will not let it go; my heart shall not reproach
me so long as I live.”).
63. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, BAB. BATHRA MISHNAH TRAC. 1:6 (Jacob Neusner ed., 2011).
64. One of the Talmudic Rabbis, Samuel bar Nahmani, declared, “Job never lived, but was
merely a metaphor.” This, however, was a disputed opinion. Id.
65. See MILES, supra note 57, at 312 (“[W]hen the Lord promises double compensation, he
implies that his own actions have gone too far. The Lord’s action here, if not explicit repentance,
is unmistakable atonement and implicit repentance.”).
This also dispenses with still another argument, that while Job was indeed steadfast, Moses’s
position of partial challenge but eventual retreat is actually superior. David Hartman describes
his mentor Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik’s position as being that
Jews have a right to think, to feel, and to love only to the degree that they are prepared
to submit totally to whatever God will demand of them. . . . [These feelings can
persist] only up to a certain point, beyond which one is required to accept
unquestioningly the inexplicable demands of God and the authority of tradition.
DAVID HARTMAN, A LIVING COVENANT 88 (1985). Applying this standard would elevate Moses
over Job—save again for the fact that Job gets the reconciliation that eludes Moses.
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by mutual failings (p. 15). Rachel Adler notes, though, that there is a
more sinister undertone to this metaphor given the rhetoric used to
describe it throughout the Bible: A “covenant-marriage between God
and Israel . . . in which an adulterous and abandoning wife is threatened
and battered by an enraged and violent husband. What is even more
troubling is that the texts justified the battering; they agreed that the
battering was both appropriate and deserved.” 66 At several points
throughout the Hebrew Bible, God engages in sexual abuse against
Israel, usually as punishment for his people’s transgressions. These
actions typically occur in the midst of prophetic rage, and thus are
unmediated by the Biblical characters who share close relationships
with God and could potentially intercede. Though there are several
cases in the Bible in which God sexually abuses Israel, the following
passage in Hosea stands out because it appears to cross over into the
territory of rape: “Now I shall discover her lewdness in the sight of her
lovers; and none shall deliver her out of Mine hand.” 67 In another
section, God appears to imprison Israel and allow for her gang-rape by
others. 68
Since these actions occur within the context of punishment,
retribution is enlisted as the justification for God’s acts. 69 But the fact
that Israel has transgressed (and is, in a sense, no longer “innocent”)
does not mean that God’s actions are automatically justified. As
Blumenthal argues, while in most abusive situations “[t]he victim
usually has not wronged the perpetrator at all; . . . even if the victim has
wronged the abuser, [it is abuse if] the abuser’s reaction is all out of
proportion to the wrong committed.” 70 Indeed, it is God’s propensity
for excessive punishment that is the subject of what the Talmud says is
God’s own prayer: “May it be my will that my mercy overcome my
anger.” 71
Certain types of punishment are never justified, even if the target
deserves punishment. Rape and sexual assault fall into this category.
There is no context in which it is ethical to rape another human being.
There is no theory of just punishment that would sanction such an act.
Jews—even Jews who have sinned—have the right and obligation to
protest against such brutalism because the punishment is, on its face, out
66. Adler, supra note 8, at 171.
67. Hosea 2:10 (emphasis added).
68. See Ezekiel 16:36–39.
69. See infra note 142 and accompanying text (discussing retribution as a justification for
divine action).
70. BLUMENTHAL, supra note 40, at 248.
71. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, BERAKHOT 7A (Jacob Neusner ed., 2011).
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of proportion to any crime that possibly could have been committed.
Yet unlike Moses, who boldly stayed standing before God (in the face
of an explicit dismissal) to plead his people’s case when God threatened
their annihilation, 72 Hosea and Ezekiel do not enjoy (or, perhaps, have
not attempted to forge) the same role that Moses had as God’s
conscience. The later Israelites had no true champion or advocate, and
God was left to proceed unrestrained and unreminded of his obligations
to his people. 73
There is particular danger here given Burt’s articulation that
obligations between humankind and God stem from a mutually caring,
almost familial relationship (pp. 12–13). The gendered domestic
violence in which God engages parallels domestic violence in the
family unit, and in both cases there is a strong tendency to overlook or
excuse behavior that generally would be an intolerable breach of public
norms. 74 As many feminists have noted, the coding of the family unit
as “private”—an effectively sacred relationship space, untouchable by
the state’s moral code—has served to legitimate abuse and violence
within the family as morally untouchable. 75 To the extent Burt presents
the whole Bible in this relationship-centric light, it is vulnerable to this
same oversight; to the extent his “political theory of the Bible” recodes
the entire relationship between citizens and the state in this light, we are
all vulnerable to it.
Resisting this impulse means recognizing that abuse has been a part
of this relationship from the beginning, and indeed has often

72. In response to the Israelites’ worship of the Golden Calf, God threatened to wipe out the
Israelites entirely and start anew. Genocide, like rape, falls in the category of inherently unjust
punishment, and Moses responds accordingly. He does not plead for mercy but rather demands
justice—God’s plan would be an “evil” he ought repent for. See text surrounding note 16, supra.
The sharp implication is that there are limits to the punishment that God can justly mete out.
73. But see Walter Brueggemann, The Costly Loss of Lament, 36 J. STUD. OLD TESTAMENT
57, 59–62 (1986) (arguing that the practice of lament also serves to put God on notice of potential
injustice in a way that demands divine response).
74. See Adler, supra note 8, at 173 (“The centerpiece of the prophetic tradition is a metaphor
for covenant as a partnership or intimacy between the parties. For progressives this metaphor
evokes both the idealized bourgeois marriage and the partnership of citizens in the nation-state.
What is decidedly under-emphasized in this account of prophetic literature is the violence
threatened or chronicled in text after text.” (footnote omitted)).
75. See, e.g., Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality under Law, 100 YALE L.J.
1281, 1311 (1991) (“In gendered light, the law’s privacy is a sphere of sanctified isolation,
impunity, and unaccountability. It surrounds the individual in his habitat. It belongs to the
individual with power. Women have been accorded neither individuality nor power. Privacy
follows those with power wherever they go, like and as consent follows women. When the
person with privacy is having his privacy, the person without power is tacitly imagined to be
consenting.”).
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characterized it. 76 And yet many of us return, over and again. Why?
Recognizing the fact of the abuse allows for “the most unbelievable of
all possible responses to our woundedness, namely, grace.” 77 As this
Review argues below, this is not an obligatory response. The abused
are not obligated to return to their abusers; walking away is always a
permissible choice. 78 But for relationships we value, we hope that
forgiveness and reconciliation are possible.
B. Standing Yet before the Lord
It is a unique fact of the Jewish religion that we have a covenant with
our God, and thus a basis for staking claims upon God. 79 The use of
this particular device places God and humankind in a legalistic
relationship with one another, capable of relying on legal argumentation
as a means for justifying certain actions and condemning others. 80 For
this reason, Judaism also holds a special, canonical place for the voice
of “rebellion”—for the “cry of resistance [is] never completely
stifled . . . . [Rather, the Jew] openly resists being shoved downward in
the balancing between him and his God. . . . It is the unprecedented
struggle in which the Jew asserts nothing less than his moral equality
with his Father.” 81
The existence of this covenant transforms God from an “absolute” to
a “constitutional” monarch. “God has lost his freedom to be arbitrary,
and man has gained the freedom of being able to challenge God . . . .”82
Through this observation, Jews developed what Rabbi Anson Laytner
calls “the law-court pattern of prayer”—prayer expressed as an
indictment by individuals (or the Israelites) against God. 83 This is a
right enjoyed by the Israelites collectively and is not restricted merely to
76. See BLUMENTHAL, supra note 40, at 242 (“We must begin, under the seal of truth, by
admitting that Scripture does indeed portray God as an abusing purpose; that God, as agent in our
sacred texts, does indeed act abusively; that God, as described in the Bible, acts like an abusing
male: husband, father, and lord.”).
77. Adler, supra note 8, at 190–91 (quoting RENITA J. WEEMS, BATTERED LOVE: MARRIAGE,
SEX, AND VIOLENCE IN THE HEBREW PROPHETS 114 (2004)).
78. See infra notes 158–61 and accompanying text.
79. See Moshe Weinfeld, Covenant, in 5 ENCYLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 1012, 1013–17 (1972).
80. See Elliot N. Dorff, The Covenant: The Transcendent Thrust in Jewish Law, in
CONTEMPORARY JEWISH ETHICS AND MORALITY: A READER 59, 65 (Elliot N. Dorff & Louis E.
Newman eds., 1995) (“God not only commands but enters into a legal relationship through the
Covenant. Therefore, such legal techniques as interpretation, usage, and recourse to course of
dealings became appropriate legal techniques to give meaning to the parties’ original
relationship.”).
81. Harold M. Schulweis, Suffering and Evil, in GREAT JEWISH IDEAS 197, 198 (Abraham
Ezra Millgram ed., 1964).
82. ERICH FROMM, YOU SHALL BE AS GODS 25 (1966).
83. ANSON LAYTNER, ARGUING WITH GOD: A JEWISH TRADITION xvii–xviii (1990).
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individuals of heightened holiness like Moses. 84 Because this covenant
obligates God “to conform to objective standards of justice,” it allows
for either humankind or God to take on the role of complainant and file
suit. 85
Recognizing—as Blumenthal does directly and as Burt does
implicitly—that God can act abusively and thus can be subject to human
challenge can lead to two opposing impulses. Burt focuses on
forgiveness—the attempt to return to a prior condition of harmony and
care that existed prior to the breach (pp. 64–65). Burt takes from the
Bible that perfect justice is impossible, that there will be mistakes, and
thus the critical question is how to recovenant, or restore, as best as
possible, what had been lost and continue the pursuit of harmony (pp.
15–19). Blumenthal, for his part, focuses on vengeance—an
uncompromising affirmation that God is wrong, we are right, and God’s
abuse of humans is unjustified and can never be justified. 86 There can
be no forgiveness for Blumenthal—only acceptance of God in all of his
facets, good and bad, abuse and love. 87
Martha Minow titles her exploration of the human and social
response to mass violence and genocide Between Vengeance and
Forgiveness. 88 The difficulty in responding to mass abuse is that every
punishment we can mete out feels inadequate, but leaving the crime
unpunished feels intolerable. 89 We want retribution and reconciliation,
and it feels as if both are out of reach and toxic to the other.
Between vengeance and forgiveness lies reconstruction. This does
not “solve” the problem of vengeance and forgiveness—we may always
be stuck in between the two in reflecting on our past. But protest
84. J. Jonathan Schraub, Our Holy Grandfather, 65 CONSERVATIVE JUDAISM (forthcoming
2013) [hereinafter Schraub, Our Holy Grandfather](“[A] distinctive feature of the Jewish religion
[is that] . . . [n]othing and no one stands between the individual Jew and his or her God. . . .
God’s covenant with the Jews was not a covenant with a nation, or with a priestly class or with
Moses or Aaron or any other designated leader, it was a covenant with individuals and
families.”). In support he cites Exodus 24:7 (“Then [Moses] took the record of the covenant and
read it aloud to the people. And they said, ‘All that the lord has spoken we will faithfully do!’”);
Joshua 24:15, 22 (“But I and my household will serve the Lord . . . . But the people replied to
Joshua, ‘No, we will serve the Lord!’”); and Deuteronomy 5:3–4 (“It was not with our fathers that
the lord made this covenant, but with us, the living, every one of us who is here today. Face to
face, the Lord spoke to you out of the fire.”).
85. Adler, supra note 8, at 181.
86. BLUMENTHAL, supra note 40, at 265–67.
87. See id. at 267 (“One cannot forgive an abusing f/Father. . . . We cannot forgive God and
concentrate on God’s goodness. Rather, we will try to accept God—the bad along with the
good—and we will speak our lament.”).
88. MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER
GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998).
89. Id. at 4 (quoting HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 241 (1958)).
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theology has a message for the future as well. Just as a lawsuit can
enjoin future wrongs, protest theology, though not erasing or forgiving
the wrong, can perhaps create conditions where they won’t reoccur.
The building blocks upon which the relationship is recreated are yet
more strident demands for justice and fairness. 90
The theological theory outlined by both Burt and Blumenthal
presupposes that, in spite of the vast asymmetry in power, the human
prosecutor nonetheless has leverage over the divine. She has it because
God desires a relationship with humankind from which humans can
elect to withdraw. 91 She has it because the raw power of the wrong
may be strong enough to compel even God into a response (as in Job).
She has it because God, in entering into a covenant, implicitly concedes
that principles of justice have an effect on him—not an indomitable one,
but an effect all the same. And so one response to abuse that lies
between vengeance and forgiveness is to call upon God to cleave closer
to his creed—to make real his promises so we might credibly say “never
again.”
Abraham, arguing for Sodom, provides a template for these suits
when he informs God, “Far be it from you” to slay the innocent
alongside the wicked. 92 He appeals to God with reference to God’s
own qualities: “Shall not the judge of all the earth do right?” 93 That
Abraham is able to make such a statement “marks the fundamental
change in the concept of God as a result of the covenant. . . .
[Abraham] has a right to demand that God uphold his principle of
justice.” 94 In contrast to his general passivity, here Abraham “is
surprisingly audacious in the cause of justice, a stance that could
scarcely have been predicted from the obedient and pious Abraham of
the preceding episodes.” 95
Blumenthal postulates that God has an innate sense of fairness to
which humans can appeal in pursuit of justice. 96 He declares this to be
the first of “six personalist attributes of God.” 97 This sense of fairness
90. See id. at 22–23 (discussing the emphasis on building post-conflict institutions that can
prevent similar atrocities from reoccurring).
91. See, e.g., Schraub, For the Sin, supra note 24, at 454 (“Job is pressing every advantage
that he has over God. And it is wrong to suggest that Job has none. He has with him and behind
him the entire weight of the covenantal relationship with God.”).
92. Genesis 18:25.
93. Id.
94. FROMM, supra note 82, at 28.
95. ROBERT ALTER, THE FIVE BOOKS OF MOSES: A TRANSLATION WITH COMMENTARY 89
n.23 (2004). It is also sharply distinct from Abraham’s later behavior during the Akedah.
96. BLUMENTHAL, supra note 40, at 15.
97. Id. at 14–15. The six personalist attributes are as follows: (1) God must be fair; (2) God
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is the terrain upon which humans can talk to God and challenge divine
acts. In the words of David Frank, “Abraham, Moses, and Job assume
that God is just, an assumption that God shares. This shared
commitment to justice, or Tsedek, constitutes the shared ground of
argument for God and God’s human interlocutors.” 98
This formulation—that God must be fair—is somewhat odd, as it
conflicts with Blumenthal’s third attribute that God occasionally acts
wrongfully, for he is “powerful but not perfect.” 99 I would rephrase this
formulation to: God can be appealed to in the language of justice and
fairness. That is, God can act unfairly, but this does not mean that
fairness is not an integral element of God, any more than humans cease
to have a conscience once we commit a wrongdoing. The language of
justice exhibits a compulsion upon God—a resistible one, but a
compulsion nonetheless. God does not always respond to human
prayers (or indictments), 100 but presumably—following Burt’s powerful
presentation of God in a relationship with humanity—He is not
indifferent to them.
The important thread of this whole gambit, however, is that it is not a
rejection of God. Whether or not one ultimately believes God will be
responsive, the law-court model presumes two players in relationship
with one another—it is a request for engagement, not a writ of
divorce. 101 The presumption is that although God is behaving in an evil
manner, good still exists within God. Both good and evil come from the
same source, and the latter does not expunge the former. 102 Job’s
demand for a vindicator is not a request for a “counter-deity” whose
force can match God, but rather an appeal to those aspects of God
which Job still believes recognize the fundamental righteousness of his
plea. 103 It is because we still do care about God and our relationship
with him that we argue so strenuously to God as a potential agent for
vindication, even in the midst of his own victimization of us.
addresses, and can be addressed by, humankind; (3) God is powerful, but not perfect; (4) God is
loving; (5) God gets angry; and (6) God is partisan. See id. at 14–20.
98. David Frank, Arguing with God, Talmudic Discourse, and the Jewish Countermodel:
Implications for the Study of Argumentation, 41 ARGUMENTATION & ADVOC. 71, 75–76 (2004).
99. BLUMENTHAL, supra note 40, at 16.
100. See LAYTNER, supra note 83, at xviii (noting that only in “certain cases” does God render
a “divine response to the petition”).
101. See BLUMENTHAL, supra note 40, at 284 (“Addressing the abusing God is not easy . . . .
One must have a deep commitment to God, a deep desire to want to be with God, to want to have
a relationship with God.”).
102. Schraub, For the Sin, supra note 24, at 448 (“The Book of Job is an unequivocal
rejection of the Manichean or Gnostic belief that good and evil emanate from different sources.
Rather, it is clear in Job that God is the primary source of both good and evil.”).
103. Id. at 453.
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C. “Pleading God’s Cause”
God does not lack for defenders. All those who have challenged God
have had to experience God’s apologists; those who, in Job’s biting
words, “plead God’s cause.” 104 In his provocative play, The Trial of
God, Elie Wiesel goes so far as to cast Satan in the role of God’s
defense attorney. 105
Nonetheless, there can be no fair trial without a defense, and so it is
incumbent to respond to some of the classic arguments put forth to
explain away seeming injustices and wrongfulness done through God’s
hand in the Hebrew Bible. This Section addresses three such defenses:
(1) God lacks a persona or characteristics that can be judged; (2) We
can historicize away offensive passages as simply the products of their
time; and (3) God’s actions are “really” just (either as a matter of axiom
or if “properly” interpreted). None of these give due accord to the
textual record the Tanakh provides or the historical understanding of
God and humankind’s relationship to him.
1. God Lacks a Persona (or at Least One Cognizable to Humans)
One response to any effort to judge God’s statements or actions in the
Bible is to assert that they are merely metaphorical—substitutions for
the inherent unknowability of God. Indeed, Maimonides held that any
description of God must be metaphorical because God is so wholly
other that He cannot be the subject of any attributes humans could
possibly comprehend. 106 The problem with this argument is that it
seems incompatible for two reasons: first, with the way religion is
typically practiced; and second, as the more basic problem that it would
seemingly preclude speaking about God in any way whatsoever. 107
The Bible, of course, speaks of God and God’s persona quite often,

104. When Job’s friends seek to dissuade him from his insistence of his innocent, Job
demands of them:
Will you speak unjustly on God’s behalf?
Will you speak deceitfully for Him?
Will you be partial towards Him?
Will you plead God’s cause?
Will it go well when He examines you?
Will you fool Him as one fools men?
Job 13:7–9.
105. ELIE WIESEL, THE TRIAL OF GOD 161 (2d ed. 1995).
106. See MAIMONIDES, GUIDE TO THE PERPLEXED 111–37 (Shlomo Pines trans., 1963). For
example, Maimonides explains that “the Hebrew language uses the word passage in a figurative
sense with reference to voice.” Id. at 50.
107. See SAADIA GAON, THE BOOK OF BELIEFS AND OPINIONS 94–102 (Samuel Rosenblatt
trans., 1948).
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and accordingly we are presented with a God who “walks and talks,”
who “feels anger, despair, and joy,” and who “exercises moral
judgment.” 108 God “enters into and is constrained by human time.”109
Through these characteristics, the Jewish people are able to engage in
the intimate relationship that is the hallmark of their faith. 110 These
attributes are what enable a meaningful relationship between humans
and God; it is unclear how the Jewish people could relate to a divinity
that was merely an unquantifiable abstract and not, at least partially,
human. 111
The idea that God lies beyond direct human comprehension is also
difficult to square with the Biblical text. An essential attribute of God’s
biblical persona is that “God addresses, and can be addressed.” 112 God
and humankind speak regularly in the Bible, and God modifies his
actions in response to human intervention. Abraham’s famous
intercession on behalf of the innocents of Sodom and Gomorrah is the
classic example. Though God contemplated hiding his plans for the
cities’ destruction from Abraham, 113 he instead conferred with
Abraham, who did not react with passivity and acquiescence. Instead
(in what Burt notes is the first Biblical mention of “justice” and
“righteousness” (p. 70)), Abraham “stood yet before the Lord” and
pleaded for the lives of the innocent—bargaining God down by
extracting promises to spare the city if there were fifty, forty-five, forty,
thirty, twenty, and finally ten innocent persons residing in the cities.114
When God threatens to destroy the Israelites for erecting the Golden
Calf, Moses intercedes and pleads with God to “repent of this evil
against Thy people.” 115 And, we are told, God listened: “HaShem
repented of the evil which He said He would do unto His people.” 116
Fundamentalist scholars who proclaim that God is unchanging justify
this stance on the grounds that change implies imperfection—from
better to worse or vice versa. 117 But God does change. God changes

108. BLUMENTHAL, supra note 40, at 6.
109. Frank, supra note 98, at 74.
110. See SOLOMON SCHECHTER, ASPECTS OF RABBINIC THEOLOGY 47 (1993) (arguing that
the “intimacy of relationship is reciprocal” between God and the Jews).
111. For example, Gordon Kaufman’s formulation that God is “creativity.” See generally
GORDON D. KAUFMAN, IN THE BEGINNING . . . CREATIVITY (2004).
112. BLUMENTHAL, supra note 40, at 15.
113. Genesis 18:17 (“God said, ‘Shall I hide from Abraham what I am going to do?’”).
114. Genesis 18:24–32.
115. Exodus 32:12.
116. Exodus 32:14.
117. See, e.g., JAMES P. BOYCE, ABSTRACT OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 73 (2006)
(“Perfection permits neither increase as though he lacks, nor decrease as though he can lose.
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from being unbound by covenant to being bound by one. God changes
his mind on numerous occasions when he threatens to wipe out the
Israelites. God changes the standards by which he will judge Sodom
and Gomorrah. God changes in response to human prayer. This, in a
sense, is the cost of God engaging in the creative project at all—God
creates humankind and thus has to account for other entities capable of
speaking back to him. 118
2. Offensive Passages are Anachronistic and Can be Abandoned
On the opposite side of the traditionalist argument, some argue for
simply excising the offensive passages as products of their time,
anachronistic, and thus not properly thought of as probative of God’s
true character. 119 Under this view, we should not view the entirety of
the Bible as literally accurate. Instead, the Biblical text should be
selectively modified or downplayed to marginalize those sections that
seem in tension with general pious norms which accord “proper” (which
is to say, utterly deferential) respect to God. 120
To some extent, this argument is less “untraditional” than one would
think, as demonstrated through the doctrine of kethib/qere. At various
points in the Hebrew Bible, the written text (kethib) is marginalized
(literally—it is moved to the margins of the page) in favor of an
alternative iteration that is supposedly demanded by tradition (qere). 121
One prominent example of this has already been mentioned above—
while we are told “Abraham stood yet before the Lord” to plead for
Sodom and Gomorrah, 122 this is actually qere, displacing the kethib

Change must be for the worse or for the better, but God cannot become worse or better.”); 1
CHARLES HODGE, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 390 (1873) (“[God] can neither increase nor
decrease. He is subject to no process of development, or of self-evolution. His knowledge and
power can never be greater or less. He can never be wiser or holier, or more righteous or more
merciful than He ever has been and ever must be.”).
118. See Frank, supra note 98, at 75 (“The risk entailed in argument is a function of God’s
creation, a creation that does not provide God or humans with clear choices, sufficient
information, or the clarity necessary to command immaculate perception.”); MILES, supra note
57, at 12 (observing that God “enters time and is changed by experience,” often being
“unpleasantly surprised”).
119. See, e.g., ROSEMARY RADFORD RUETHER, SEXISM AND GOD-TALK: TOWARD A
FEMINIST THEOLOGY 19 (1983) (“[W]hatever diminishes or denies the full humanity of women
must be presumed not to reflect the divine or an authentic relation to the divine . . . .”).
120. See, e.g., GRACIA FAY ELLWOOD, BATTER MY HEART 3 (1988) (claiming, as a Quaker,
that “[b]ecause the final authority for Friends is not the written page but the Light within . . . it
[is] comparatively easy to learn from the Bible’s wealth without struggling with ‘difficult’
passages that affirm violence”).
121. See ROBERT GORDIS, THE BIBLICAL TEXT IN THE MAKING: A STUDY OF THE KETHIBQERE (1971).
122. Genesis 18:22.
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wherein it is instead “God [who] remained standing before
Abraham.” 123 The presumption that God might be in a supplicant’s
position before Abraham was explosive, so while it was not erased, it
was pushed aside in favor of a less contentious formulation. Likewise,
in Job’s final speech, he is generally said to open by telling God “I
know that you can do all things” (the Hebrew verb for “I know” would
be yadati). But this is qere—the kethib is actually “You know you can
do all things” (yadata). This minor modification changes the entire
meaning of the sentence—from cowed submission to biting sarcasm. 124
While certainly much, if not all, of the Bible is not meant to be
understood literally, there are two different directions one could go from
this starting position. The first is to essentially ignore offensive
passages entirely, or to suppress them to the greatest degree possible.
However, this position essentially renders significant swaths of the text
as a nullity, and that is incompatible with the belief that the whole of the
Bible is holy and sacred. 125 Mere words can be historicized, but the
Torah and Bible are not mere words. We are commanded, after all, to
“teach them diligently to [our] children.” 126 As Judith Plaskow notes,
the Bible “is not just history, however, but also living memory.” 127
Regardless of its literal truth or allegorical nature, each and every
provision of the Bible carries with it meaning that demands an
interpretative response. 128
The second position, then, is to accept story as story, but question
what one should conclude from the words. 129 If, as Rabbi Abraham
Joshua Heschel famously wrote, “[a]s a report about revelation the
Bible itself is a midrash” (commentary), 130 what are we supposed to
123. See Schraub, For the Sin, supra note 24, at 459 n.30.
124. Id. at 441.
125. See BLUMENTHAL, supra note 40, at 243 (“This approach seems to me to be spiritually,
as well as theologically and textually, unsophisticated precisely because it suppresses the
‘difficult’ side of human and divine being . . . .”).
126. Deuteronomy 6:7. This commandment was rewritten and echoed by John Quincy Adams
and later Warren Burger as the model for how Americans should treat the Constitution. See infra
note 187 and accompanying text (explaining the connection Adams drew between the Torah and
the Constitution).
127. Judith Plaskow, Standing Again at Sinai, in CONTEMPORARY JEWISH THEOLOGY: A
READER, supra note 50, at 256.
128. See Adler, supra note 8, at 176 (“Explaining wife-beating metaphors as reflections of an
earlier society’s customs provides a historical description of the text’s context but leaves the
theological questions untouched: In what sense are such texts sacred texts? What is their
authority, their normative power?”).
129. See BLUMENTHAL, supra note 40, at 238 (“I choose to engage seriously the texts as we
have received them.”).
130. ABRAHAM JOSHUA HESCHEL, GOD IN SEARCH OF MAN: A PHILOSOPHY OF JUDAISM 185
(1955).
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take from the divine text as it is given to us? 131 What is the point of the
“commentary” that, for example, God threatened to rape Israel or
imprison her to be raped by others? 132 We are supposed to draw
something from it, and that something ought not be sugar-coated
regardless of whether or not the events in question literally occurred.
Rabbi Gordon Tucker expounds on this theme in urging that the text
ought to be seen as a springboard for interpretation and debate rather
than a divine command. He draws upon the Biblical mandate that the
“rebellious son” be turned over to be stoned, 133 and the subsequent
Talmudic interpretation that “no one had ever been made subject to the
. . . law . . . [and] no one ever would be.” 134 But if that were the case,
“[w]hy was it in the Torah, then? Because the enterprise of expounding
it would itself be rewarding.” 135 A belief in the Bible’s holiness can
survive a belief that it is not entirely literal, that it is not entirely
providential, even that it is not entirely just. 136 But it cannot survive the
belief that it is not relevant.
3. God’s Actions Are Inherently Just
Finally, one could still argue that justice is inherent in the notion of
divinity, hence, the particular events in question are not actually
instances of injustice, but rather are appropriate, permissible, or
otherwise tolerable. Moses exclaims in the Book of Deuteronomy:
“The Rock! His work is perfect, for all His ways are just; A God of
faithfulness and without injustice, Righteous and upright is He.”137
Operating from this standpoint, Milton Himmelfarb held that a “just
God is a dogma of Judaism and has been since before the days of
Jeremiah.” 138 This notion fiats that God’s actions are just as an integral

131. Cf. DAVID HARTMAN, A LIVING COVENANT: THE INNOVATIVE SPIRIT IN TRADITIONAL
JUDAISM 9 (1985) (“The tradition calls upon the community to renew the covenant in each
generation. As the rabbis teach, one must live by the Torah as if the Torah had been given in
one’s own time.”).
132. See supra Part II.A.3.
133. Deuteronomy 18:18–21.
134. GORDON TUCKER, HALAKHIC AND METAHALAKHIC ARGUMENTS CONCERNING
JUDAISM AND HOMOSEXUALITY 7 (2006), available at http://www.bjpa.org/Publications/down
loadPublication.cfm?PublicationID=7838.
135. Id. (Hebrew omitted).
136. See id. at 6 & nn.16–17 (citing Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel in support of the belief
that the Bible may not be literal or literally written by God and yet is still holy).
137. Deuteronomy 32:4. See ABRAHAM COHEN, EVERYMAN’S TALMUD 16 (1975) (“[God’s]
judgments are always just. With Him there is no unrighteousness, nor forgetfulness, nor respect
of persons, nor taking of bribes.” (internal quotations omitted)).
138. Milton Himmelfarb, Commentary on Homeland and Holocaust: Issues in the Jewish
Religious Situation, in THE RELIGIOUS SITUATION: 1968, at 64, 65 (Donald R. Cutler ed., 1968).
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and unchallengeable part of Jewish tradition.
It is certainly true that a (at best) passive approach to divine injustice
has been the dominant one throughout Jewish history. 139 Still, as a
response to abuse, this is worrisome, for the instinct to deny this sort of
filial abuse tracks for too many abuse victims a systematic societal
denial of the wrong. The abusive passages of the Bible are already
“revictimization” for the victims of abuse. 140 To compound this by
repeating the denial so many of them have experienced displays a
shocking lack of empathy and would seemingly convert the entire
project of theology into a tool of evil. That is to say, each reading of the
Holy Scriptures would ritualistically reenact the entire personal abusive
story: the injury of the victim and her impotence as against an
implacable society unmoved and unsympathetic to her sorrow.
Casting the net slightly more narrowly, most instances of divine
abuse in the Bible are at least nominally preceded by human
wrongdoing. 141
Hence, they can be justified as righteous
punishment. 142 But this apologia is problematic. First, it clearly does
not account for the Book of Job, where God himself stipulates that Job
is blameless. Second, it is difficult to take seriously as a true exposition
of moral philosophy—as Blumenthal strikingly puts it, “I cannot accept
. . . that throwing one million children on burning pyres was justified
. . . . Nor can I accept that years of physical and/or sexual abuse is
punishment for the wrongdoing of any child.” 143 Blindly asserting that
any and all punishment is a just response to sin does not sufficiently
grapple with the structure by which humans in the Bible engage with
God. Abraham and Moses do not simply make bare pleas for mercy in
the face of wrongdoing. They utilize the language of justice, implying
that it is not just a whimsical preference for mercy to which God is
responsive, but a deeper moral commitment that might be violated by
certain types of retributive acts. 144 This latter point—that certain types
139. See LAYTNER, supra note 83, at 115–16 (discussing the eventual preeminence of Rabbi
Akiba’s holding that Jews must be submissive and patient in the face of divine adversity).
140. BLUMENTHAL, supra note 40, at 242.
141. Job is the notable and shocking exception.
142. See, e.g., LISA AIKEN, WHY ME, GOD?: A JEWISH GUIDE FOR COPING WITH SUFFERING
18 (1996) (“[God’s] system of justice is His way of showing interest and investment in us, not a
way of getting even with us when we misbehave.”); DAVID KRAEMER, RESPONSES TO
SUFFERING IN CLASSICAL RABBINIC LITERATURE 22 (1995) (“[I]f Israel appears to be punished
before or more severely than other nations, this seeming injustice can easily be explained: others
are not held accountable for the same transgressions as Israel and Judah. This shift in perspective
allows us to understand Israel’s afflictions not as cruelty or harsh justice but as a loving,
parentlike rebuke.”).
143. BLUMENTHAL, supra note 40, at 243.
144. See id. at 248 (noting that in abusive situations, “even if the victim has wronged the
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of punishment are unjust even in the face of wrongdoing—has risen in
prominence in the post-Holocaust era. Suffering may sometimes be a
consequence of sin, but no sin could justify the imposition of the
Holocaust. 145
To be sure, at times the Bible asserts that God is infinitely and
unquestionably just. This is bluster, but it is unsustainable given the
portrayal of God’s character in the Bible. God informs us that “God is
not a man, that He should lie; neither the son of man, that He should
repent: when He hath said, will He not do it? Or when He hath spoken,
will He not make it good?” 146 Yet earlier in the Tanakh, God is
instructed to repent by Moses, and agrees. 147 It is true that at any given
moment, God’s response to critique may be to assert his own
infallibility, relying on his untrammeled power to bludgeon challengers
into submission. So it was in Job where God came “out of the
whirlwind” 148 to boast of his creation of the Leviathan149 and his
absolute dominance over all things. 150 The speech is one of pure
power, dispensing entirely with argument or justification in favor of a
litany of God’s powers and capacities. 151 But this is a sign of
impotence, not omnipotence. God simply has no answer to Job’s basic,
and entirely justified, complaint. 152 Paired with God’s extreme abuse of
Job over the preceding weeks, “[t]his is a frightening picture of a God
who is at war with Himself and out of control . . . . God has painted
Himself into a corner from which he bellows forth, a wounded potentate
unable to ensure the predominance of His propensity for good (mercy)
over His propensity for punishment (justice) . . . .” 153
It is only at the end that God returns from the brink and admits his
mistake. God instructs Job’s friends, rather than Job himself, to

abuser, the abuser’s reaction is out of all proportion to the wrong committed”).
145. See Eliezer Berkovits, Faith after the Holocaust, in CONTEMPORARY JEWISH
THEOLOGY: A READER, supra note 50, at 355 (“Nor do we for a single moment entertain the
thought that what happened to European Jewry in our generation was divine punishment for sins
committed by them. It was injustice absolute, injustice countenanced by God.”).
146. Numbers 23:19.
147. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text (quoting the Book of Exodus).
148. Job 40:6.
149. Job 40:25.
150. Job 41:3 (“Whatsoever is under the whole heaven is Mine.”).
151. See MILES, supra note 57, at 314 (“Few speeches in all of literature can more properly be
called overpowering than the Lord’s speeches to Job from the whirlwind.”).
152. See Frank, supra note 98, at 79 (“Job has not questioned God’s power, claimed greater
knowledge than God, or to have been present at creation. He asks for justice. In response, God
proclaims God’s might, but does not approach the question of justice . . . . God offers no
explanation for Job’s anguish, which appears to have no reason or redemptive purpose.”).
153. Schraub, For the Sin, supra note 24, at 450.

7_SCHRAUB.DOCX

2013]

4/18/2013 11:25 AM

Our Divine Constitution

1239

repent—for they “have not spoken of Me the thing that is right, as My
servant Job has.” 154 This is an interesting demand, for it was Job’s
friends who “ple[d] God’s cause” in the face of Job’s relentless
indictment. 155 And yet this command, repeated twice, 156 represents the
last words God speaks to humankind in the Hebrew Bible. 157
D. Relationship after Rupture
To speak of divine evil in the sense that has been discussed in the
preceding pages requires us to admit at least the possibility that the
breach is irreparable. After the Holocaust, Emmanuel Levinas wrote a
provocative and influential essay on the topic of “loving Torah more
than God,” in which he advocated a turn away from “direct contact”
with God as a ward against madness. 158 There are disturbing Biblical
indicators of this potential as well. We have already noted that God’s
capitulation to Job represents the last time God speaks to humankind in
the Hebrew Bible; 159 this echoes the end of God and Abraham’s
relationship, which was likewise silenced after the Akedah. 160 The
Kotzker Rebbe deployed this possibility as a mixture of plea and threat
in prayer:
Send us our Messiah, for we have no more strength to suffer. Show
me a sign, O God. Otherwise I rebel against You. If you do not keep
Your Covenant, then neither will I keep the promise, and it is all over:
we are through being Your Chosen People, Your unique treasure. 161

It is true that we all hope for this possibility of reconciliation, even
after breach. As Adler puts it, “if all errors were fatal, we would be too
paralyzed by despair to wish to assume responsibility or to desire
integrity.” 162 But this is an option, not a mandate—a voluntary decision
154. Job 42:7.
155. See Job 13:8.
156. Job 42:7–8.
157. Schraub, For the Sin, supra note 24, at 441 (“[I]t is far from coincidental that the Book of
Job represents the last time in the Tanach that God ever addresses man.”). He adds: “[I]t is not
Job who is silenced by God but God who is silenced by Job.” Id. With regards to the use of pure
power as a substitute for reason and argumentation, it appears that God absorbed the lesson. One
of the most famous Talmudic stories ends with God laughing that “my children have overcome
me” after a majority of Rabbis overrule several direct divine interventions in favor of their
consensus understanding regarding interpreting a particular purity law. BABYLONIAN TALMUD,
BABA MESI’A 59B (Jacob Neusner, ed. 2011). The Rabbis pointed out that the “the Torah has
already been given from Mount Sinai, so we do not pay attention to echoes.” Id.
158. EMMANUEL LEVINAS, DIFFICULT FREEDOM: ESSAYS IN JUDAISM 144 (Sean Hand trans.,
1990).
159. See supra notes 153–57 and accompanying text.
160. Schraub, For the Sin, supra note 24, at 441.
161. LAYTNER, supra note 83, at 189.
162. Adler, supra note 8, at 188–89. Adler argues that if there is to be responsibility and
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to renew the covenantal relationship and attempt to return to harmony,
not “a moral norm that stands outside or above the wishes of the
disputants themselves” (p. 300).
So why do we care? Why do we bother to even pursue renewal?
Blumenthal answers simply: “[H]aving experienced that Presence, I
cannot deny that it exists, nor can I deny that it engages me and that I
engage it.” 163 What this boils down to is that we cannot necessarily
control who or what we care about. Having had this relationship in the
past, we can no longer simply elect to become pure strangers. It may be
God who makes this the most clear, for God obviously does have the
raw physical power to terminate any relationship with humankind
whenever he desires. But what God cannot control is the feeling of
need he possesses for human companionship. “His rage . . . however
terrible, is, ultimately, helpless rage. . . . God is dependent on the other
partner for what God wants, a desire that no amount of stripping or
whipping can satisfy.” 164
Job appears to be in this same position. Job is clearly furious with
God, and rightfully so. At one point, he even contemplates breaking off
the relationship entirely: “Let me alone! My life is just a breath. What
is man that You make so much of him . . . ? Why should You make me
Your target . . . ?” (p. 289, quoting Job 7:17–21). Yet eventually this
part of Job’s defiance crumbles. He does not want to turn away from
the relationship; if anything, his language seeks to bring God closer
(albeit in confrontation). He laments the loss of their prior closeness,
but cannot forget its power. What may be Job’s most purely anguished
cry comes in chapter 13, when he calls forth: “Why do you hide your
face, and treat me like an enemy?” 165 What is striking here is what Job
is not saying. Despite being subject to a torrent of divine abuse, Job is
no longer calling on God to leave him alone. He does not follow his
wife’s advice to “curse God and die.” 166 Much the opposite, he is
calling on God to come back to him. In a literal sense, of course, God
never left—as Job is all too painfully aware—but what Job is referring
to is not literal proximity, but rather God returning back into the valued,
meaningful, covenantal relationship. What seems to wound Job worst
of all is not the physical scabs and boils, but the sense that he has been
abandoned; that the special relationship he enjoys with God as a
accountability, “our only hope is in the possibility of teshuvah, return and reconciliation, the
possibility that injuries can be healed.” Id. at 189.
163. BLUMENTHAL, supra note 40, at 238.
164. Adler, supra note 8, at 192.
165. Job 13:24.
166. Job 2:9.
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member of the human species and thus as God’s “partner in creation”
has been shattered.
This feeling of abandonment—of being written out of a relationship
and community of value—is sharp and real. The breach wounds not
just because of the tangible harms, or even the expressive message it
sends about our relative worth and value. It hurts us because it comes
from a source we find important and meaningful.
When the
Conservative Rabbinate decreed that same-sex homosexual
relationships were Halakhically impermissible, Rabbi Joel Roth
conceded that this demand could legitimately leave its subjects
“fill[ed] . . . with both anguish and anger.” 167 If one did not care about
Judaism or the Jewish community, it is unclear why this decision would
be all that “anguishing,” as opposed to just another annoyingly
retrograde attitude by a backwards religious sect. 168 It is only for those
who do consider the (Conservative) Jewish community to be theirs that
this anguish manifests, for it places persons of homosexual orientation,
in large part, outside of the Halakhic community that they still value and
desire to be enveloped inside of—and one they fundamentally believe,
in their experience, can envelope them. 169 To be rejected and cast out
from that community leaves a brutal mark. While sometimes these
ruptures are simply too great and cause the entire relationship to
fracture, often we are not in control of what we care about, and find
167. Joel Roth, Homosexuality, in RESPONSA 1991-2000: THE COMMITTEE ON JEWISH LAW
STANDARDS OF THE CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT 643 (2000). In 2006, the Conservative
movement voted on a series of new responsa, simultaneously reaffirming Rabbi Roth’s opinion
(approved by a 13-8-4 vote), JOEL ROTH, HOMOSEXUALITY REVISITED (2006), available at
http://www.vbs.org/uploaded/Be_With_Us/Documents/Roth_Final.pdf, and largely overturning it
by maintaining only the prohibition on male-male anal sex (approved by a 13-12 vote), ELLIOT N.
DORFF, DANIEL S. NEVINS & AVRAM I. REISNER, HOMOSEXUALITY, HUMAN DIGNITY, AND
HALAKHA (2006), available at http://www.canonist.com/wpcontent/uploads/plugins/homosexual
ityhumandignityandhalakhah.pdf.
Classical Judaism has no trouble validating two contradictory positions as both constituting
valid and authoritative Biblical interpretations. This is most famously articulated as the “these
and these” principle, affirming that the conflicting schools of Hillel and Shammei both “are the
words of the Living God.” BABYLONIAN TALMUD, ERUBIN 13B (Jacob Neusner ed., 2011). See
also Suzanne Last Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model in
Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 813, 836 (1993); Robert Cover,
Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE
LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 239, 243 (1995) [hereinafter Cover, Obligation]. Because
these majority opinions, though in opposition to one another, both represent theologically valid
choices, either can be adopted by local Rabbis and congregations.
168. Tucker, supra note 134, at 21 (“They [(observant gay and lesbian Jews)] agree that
halakhah has a valid moral claim to obedience by the community (which is why they care about
what happens, for example, at the [Committee on Jewish Law and Standards].”)
169. See id. at 18 (saying of Halakhichally-committed gay Jews that they “yearn for the vision
they have of a normalized life within halakhah to be shared more widely”).
AND

7_SCHRAUB.DOCX

1242

4/18/2013 11:25 AM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 44

ourselves compelled to try to mend and repair what we feel we have
lost.
It is precisely the possibility of angry reproach that provides at least
the possibility of healing. Irving Greenberg argues that the ability to
express this anger “is the first stage of a new relationship, perhaps the
only kind of relationship possible with God at this point in history.” 170
Anger, after all, “is more compatible with love and involvement than
pleasant niceties and old compliments.” 171 As furious as God is at
Job’s presumption, Job may well “have saved the Lord from
himself.” 172 Drawn into the fray of human pain and committing to
holding himself accountable to human critique, God is transformed, and
this transformation holds out the possibility of something that
transcends the injustice of the past. 173
III. OUR DIVINE CONSTITUTION
The previous Parts’ arguments were primarily theological,
forwarding a particular vision of God’s persona in the Hebrew Bible
and its implications for how humans and God should interrelate. This
Part presents another claim—that the American Constitution and the
corpus of constitutional law occupy a similar space in the American
psyche to God and religious law. The status of the Constitution has a
similar “conventional” view attached to it—that it is righteous and
just—and this “pious” outlook towards the Constitution channels how
we understand its operation in American society in ways that have not
yet been fully comprehended.
A. Constitution as (Spiritual) Culture
Our understanding of culture has evolved dramatically in the past
several decades. While conventionally understood as a static “thing”
that is relatively immobilized over time, 174 culture is now read to be
170. Greenberg, supra note 49, at 40.
171. Id. See LEVINAS, supra note 158, at 145 (“[E]thics and principles install a personal
relationship worthy of the name. Loving the Torah even more than God means precisely having
access to a personal God against Whom one may rebel—that is to say, for Whom one may die.”);
Schraub, Our Holy Grandfather, supra note 84 (“The concept of approaching God means very
little because what passes institutionally for approaching God has been stripped of all maturity
and reduced to the repetitive, weekly incantation of familiar, ritual doxologies.”).
172. MILES, supra note 57, at 327.
173. See Samuel Balentine, “What are Human Beings that You Make So Much of Them?”
Divine Disclosure from the Whirlwind: “Look at Behemoth,” in LINAFELT & BEAL, supra note
42, at 259 (“The protest or lament forces both God and Israel to recalculate the possibilities and
the requirements of the covenant relationship. It draws God into the fray of human pain and
trouble, and as a result God must do or be something new.”).
174. See Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495, 511–12 (2001) (tracing
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plural and contestable—“fluid, ‘webs of significance’ or ‘meanings’
that individuals create and share in order to make a home in, and indeed
control, their world.” 175 In determining what these meanings are,
“those with greater power in a community attempt to make their
interpretations of a culture dominant while those with less power offer
alternative visions of the culture’s meaning.” 176
Law, and constitutional law in particular, is a form of culture.177
Culture is the process by which we create meaning and the result of its
creation. The Constitution acts as a covenantal credo that defines our
status as Americans—it “represents the lifeblood of the American
nation, its supreme symbol and manifestation.” 178 The operation of law
is not simply a question about what behavior society can extract from us
on pain of sanction (though it is that). It is also more broadly
constitutive of our worldview and personal commitments towards
others. 179
In this way, the process of legal interpretation delineates the borders
of membership in the community and what sundries flow from said
membership. As Ronald Dworkin puts it, the act of legal interpretation
seeks to “impose meaning on the institution . . . and then to restructure it
in the light of that meaning.” 180 When those with power are the ones
interpreting, this attempted imposition is backed by violence, and that
background threat of violence helps enable the restructuring. We do
not, as Robert Cover reminds us, “talk our prisoners into jail.” 181 Yet
still, we also do not venerate the Constitution solely out of fear. God
commands terror and can unleash terror as a condition for obedience,
but our relationship with God is not purely one of terror. The threat of
this outlook to nineteenth century anthropologist Edward B. Tylor).
175. Id. at 510.
176. Id. at 515.
177. See Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective, in
LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 167, 232 (1983)
(arguing that law is “constructive of social realities rather than merely reflective of them”);
Robert C. Post, Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV.
4, 54 (2003) (“[C]onstitutional law neither transparently expresses nor autonomously regulates
constitutional culture. Instead it intervenes to shape the development of that culture on the basis
of its understanding of that culture. In this way constitutional law simultaneously reflects and
restrains popular values.”)
178. HANS KOHN, AMERICAN NATIONALISM: AN INTERPRETATIVE ESSAY 8 (1957).
179. See Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (1983) {hereinafter
Cover, Nomos] (“Legal precepts and principles are not only demands made upon us by society,
the people, the sovereign, or God. They are also signs by which each of us communicates with
others.”).
180. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 47 (1986).
181. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1608 (1986) [hereinafter
Cover, Violence].
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violence exists and always exists in the shadow of our relationship with
God and the Constitution, but does not exhaust it.
The observation that this cultural dynamic between Americans and
our Constitution is something spiritual in nature is hardly novel. 182 The
Constitution, it has been argued, serves as an American “covenant”; to
be American is to be a member of the “covenanting community”
covered under the Constitution’s ambit. 183 As Sanford Levinson puts it,
“the central sacred text of our civil religion” is the Constitution.184
Thomas Grey identifies our requirement to pledge an oath to the
Constitution as explicitly substituting for religious loyalty tests—instead
of a national church, “the worship of the Constitution would serve the
unifying function of a national civil religion.” 185 The Constitution
provides us with various foundational “constitutional rights,” and the
concept of “rights,” Cover argues, occupies a similar space in Western
society as “Mitzvah” (commandment) does in Judaism—a highly
evocative, even foundational, normative framework upon which our
whole society rests. 186 Burt, too, places the Supreme Court as godly in
its stature, by virtue of it having the effective final word on interpreting
our national charter (p. 302). John Quincy Adams may have made the
connection most evident when he substituted the Constitution for the
Torah in the V’ahavta, a central Jewish prayer that follows the Shema:
“Teach the [Constitution’s] principles, teach them to your children,
speak of them when sitting in your home, speak of them when walking
by the way, when lying down and when rising up, write them upon the
doorplate of your home and upon your gates.” 187
The analogy of the Constitution to a religious tradition makes sense
for several reasons. First, as Jack Balkin notes, speaking of the
Constitution in religious terms allows us to “talk about the
commitments of a people in a creedal tradition spanning many years . . .
organized around the maintenance and interpretation of an ancient
creedal text.” 188 In both cases, there is a community that organizes
182. See generally SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988).
183. See Whittle Johnson, Little America—Big America, 58 YALE REV. 1, 11 (1968) (“To be
an American means to be a member of the ‘covenanting community’ in which the commitment to
freedom under the law . . . itself takes on transcendent importance.”).
184. LEVINSON, supra note 182, at 121.
185. Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 18 (1984).
186. Cover, Obligation, supra note 167, at 239–40.
187. LEVINSON, supra note 182, at 12. The source Biblical text is Deuteronomy 6:7–9, from
where Jews draw the commandment to place mezuzahs on their doorposts. See also supra note
126 and accompanying text.
188. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST
WORLD 7 (2011).

7_SCHRAUB.DOCX

2013]

4/18/2013 11:25 AM

Our Divine Constitution

1245

itself based on not just group affinity, but on identification with a
common creed. Unlike our European forbearers, to be an American is
not to (necessarily) be descended from a particular bloodline or tribe.
Rather, Americanness presents itself in the conscious decision to cleave
to the values and commitments put forward by the American
Constitution. 189 In this understanding, the Constitution serves more as a
covenant than a contract—it “endures as an attachment and a
commitment even when reciprocal contractual obligations have not
been fulfilled.” 190
Second, the religious metaphor links up the positive existence of laws
(their ability to command the force of the sovereign) with the moral
dimension that the Constitution seems to possess. The Constitution, and
particularly the rights it puts forward, is not just a set of laws, or even
just laws that are particularly hard to overturn. Instead, the Constitution
represents a particularly important site of social cohesion, whose
importance is not captured even by statutory protections that may
accomplish the same thing. As Cover argues, statutory protections are
dry and functionalist, carrying
very little in the way of rhetorical freight. They do not move us or
provide slogans or organizing ideologies. The provisions exist
because if we are to carry on certain functions we need them. They
neither move nor dignify in themselves. If we want to leap forward
providing a kind or degree of education heretofore unprovided, [for
example,] we usually gravitate to the rhetoric of rights . . . . 191

In this way, constitutional rights discourse represents a moral credo
that goes beyond technical rules of governance. 192 It is a rock and a
shield, protecting us from evil and allowing us to fully exercise our
values and capacities. Moreover, it serves as a wellspring of our
collective ideals—it is a deep informant of what our values are and what

189. See id. at 2 (“The story of the Constitution of We the People is a constitution of We the
People, bound not by blood but by a story, and by faith in a constitutional project.”). See also
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLITICS: THE PROMISE OF DISHARMONY 22–23 (1981)
(arguing that while for most people national identity is forged through shared historical
commonalities—ancestry, language, experience, and/or religion—the American identity is
somewhat unique as an expression of shared political commitments). While he focused on the
Declaration of Independence, Abraham Lincoln also stressed that our nation is linked not by a
common ancestry, but by a common credo. See GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG: THE
WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA 86–88 (1992).
190. Adler, supra note 8, at 196. See also WILLS, supra note 189, at 88 (“A nation born of an
idea finds that idea life-giving.”).
191. Cover, Obligation, supra note 167, at 246.
192. Analogously, Maimonides held that the Torah is sacred precisely because it seeks out
social transformation, and is not merely about technical rules of governance. MOSES
MAIMONIDES, THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED 378–85 (Shlomo Pines trans., 1963).
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we imagine our capacities to be. 193
The problem I want to focus on, however, is that elevating the
Constitution to this rarefied status risks investing it with the same sort
of jurispathic power that similarly stunts our ability to interact with
God—our imagination about what is just or fair is limited to that which
is consistent with contemporary constitutional expression. 194 Of course,
nobody actually thinks the Constitution is the equivalent of God. But “a
pale version of the religious dilemma” remains. 195 A situation in which
the Constitution can be credibly charged with immorality represents a
crisis that strikes at the very heart of what it means for it to be “the
Constitution.” 196 Because the Constitution is serving as our “higher
law,” people “find it difficult to think about rights, or reform, or justice
except in the ways that the Constitution-in-practice permits.” 197 For
this reason, the project of forging a collective based on veneration of the
Constitution took as its foundation the need to believe that “the
Constitution can do no wrong.” 198
In this way, the religious metaphor helps illuminate some
peculiarities in how we understand the meaning of constitutional
pronouncements. If we are told something violates “divine law,” what
exactly is meant? One answer is simply that the act in question will
subject the actor to sanction from a sovereign entity capable of
enforcing the proscription (whether in this life or the next). Whatever
else God has, God possesses power, but power and perfection are not
the same thing. 199 To speak of absolute divine power does not, in of
itself, make any claims as to whether the proscribed act “actually” is
morally right or wrong. It is merely a descriptive assertion that God
disapproves of a particular activity, and a warning that the wise man or
woman will refrain from engaging in it, lest he or she incur divine
wrath. But of course, the conventional understanding of calling
193. See Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 109 (1984)
(“[Law] is omnipresent in the very marrow of society—that lawmaking and law-interpreting
institutions have been among the primary sources of the pictures of order and disorder, virtue and
vice, reasonableness and craziness, Realism and visionary naiveté and of some of the most
commonplace aspects of social reality that ordinary people carry around with them and use in
ordering their lives.”).
194. BALKIN, supra note 188, at 11 (“A constitution like America’s also serves as a kind of
higher law—it states ideals of liberty, equality, and democracy that people seek to live up to over
time. The danger is that people will confuse what is just with what is constitutional.”).
195. LEVINSON, supra note 182, at 60.
196. See Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 754 (1982).
197. BALKIN, supra note 188, at 11.
198. See generally Gerard N. Magliocca, The Constitution Can Do No Wrong, 2012 U. ILL. L.
REV. 723.
199. BLUMENTHAL, supra note 40, at 16.

7_SCHRAUB.DOCX

2013]

4/18/2013 11:25 AM

Our Divine Constitution

1247

something “unbiblical” or a violation of religious or divine mandate is
more expansive—it also entails a moral judgment of the underlying
conduct. 200 To say something is morally proper but forbidden by God,
or morally wrong but demanded by God, is nonsensical—at least in the
conventional sense. 201
Compare this to the conventional understanding of labeling
Again, it could simply be
something “unconstitutional.” 202
descriptive—the act in question, which may be morally abhorrent or
may be the most important moral obligation of our time, is beyond the
sovereign’s sphere of authority. And again, this flies in the face of how
most people view the Constitution. 203
To call something
“unconstitutional” is to do more than make a technical pronouncement
about the scope of governmental authority. It is to issue a profound
moral indictment as well—it is a normatively bad thing to promote a
law that does not adhere to the principle of “equal protection,” or “due
process,” or “freedom of the press.” Americans should not do things
that violate the Constitution. We should not flout the Constitution’s
will. 204
This is not to say the existence of evil is incompatible with either a
belief in a just God or a belief in a just constitution. It is well accepted
that the Constitution sometimes permits wrong, even gravely wrong,
governmental and social behavior. 205 Similarly, any serious grappling
with the problem of theodicy generally concludes that a just God
nonetheless can permit humans, in exercise of their free will, to engage
in evil. Sometimes, God withdraws from the fray, and humans are free
to engage in a full range of ethical and unethical behavior. Often times,
200. There may be a link here to the research surrounding the “just world” theorem, which
indicates that people are more likely to define actions or activities they cannot effectively
challenge as being just or fair. See Jon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The Blame Frame: Justifying
(Racial) Injustice in America, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 419–20 (2006) (citing Melvin J.
Lerner & Carolyn H. Simmons, The Observer’s Reaction to the “Innocent Victim”: Compassion
or Rejection?, 4 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 203 (1966)).
201. The protest theology model articulated above is an attempt to resist that axiom.
202. See LEVINSON, supra note 182, at 60 (“Not even the most ardent constitutionalist
genuinely views the Constitution as the equal of God, but a pale version of the religious dilemma
is nonetheless present.”).
203. See Grey, supra note 185, at 3 (“Americans have never regarded the United States
Constitution simply as a hierarchically superior statute . . . . Rather, it has been, virtually from
the moment of its ratification, a sacred symbol, the most potent emblem (along with the flag) of
the nation itself.”).
204. See BALKIN, supra note 188, at 129 (“There is enormous pressure to believe that the
system ordained and established by the document we pledge fidelity to is itself worthy of
respect.”).
205. Gerard N. Magliocca forwards the free speech context as an area in which “lawyers take
pride in protecting thoughts that they hate.” Magliocca, supra note 198, at 732 n.51.
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the Constitution is in the same position, maintaining a studious
neutrality on a given topic area, and thus enabling the American polity
to freely decide amongst a variety of just and unjust choices. When
they elect the latter, Balkin refers to the event as “constitutional
tragedy”—“the possibility that the American people, working through
the forms and practices of the Constitution, will produce great evils.” 206
This is a standard response to the problem of theodicy, and it
basically foists the problem onto humans. God gives humans space to
act freely, and sometimes humans abuse the privilege. The Constitution
gives us a republic; it is up to us whether we are able to keep it (and
keep it just). We may or may not find the distinction persuasive—
arguably, inaction in the face of wrong can be as culpable as affirmative
action creating the wrong—but at the very least the form of the apologia
is well-known. 207
There is, however, another iteration of the problem—what Balkin
calls “constitutional evil.” Here, the possibility is that the Constitution
“as it operates in practice” may actively require great injustices. 208 The
paradigm case would be something like Prigg v. Pennsylvania 209—the
Constitution does not just permit, but affirmatively requires, state actors
to participate in enforcing the slave regime. This cuts at the heart of the
problem, because it deals not with constitutional silence or inaction, but
with the affirmative requirements of our national charter. In the
theological context, it is exceptionally difficult for us to comprehend the
possibility that such mandatory injustices are a possible aspect of the
Jewish God.
Our view of the Constitution seems similarly
constrained—all the love and veneration we feel towards the
Constitution pushes against the possibility that it might require wrong.
The risk is that our desire to see the Constitution as just will compel us
to defend grave injustices, contorting our own moral compasses to
maintain the omnibenevolent grace of our divine Constitution. 210
206. BALKIN, supra note 188, at 7. See also MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE
PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006).
207. I’m skeptical of this argument, which has become harder for Jews to sustain in the wake
of the Holocaust. The widespread claims that the Holocaust represented a potentially permanent
covenantal breach indicate that in certain situations, divine passivity in the face of human
suffering is as inexcusable as direct malevolent intervention. Therefore, my critique would
include instances of constitutional silence (e.g., the non-inclusion of gays and lesbians as a
protected class under equal protection analysis). This is a more ambitious claim, however, and
one that is not immediately necessary to defend.
208. BALKIN, supra note 188, at 7.
209. 41 U.S. 539 (1842). For a compelling analysis of the moral dilemma faced by judges
tasked with enforcing these gravely immoral laws, see generally ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE
ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975).
210. See BALKIN, supra note 188, at 127–29.
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There is, in essence, a fundamental mistake in how we conceptualize
our own attachment to the Constitution. We are taught to venerate the
Constitution, believing that the Constitution is primarily a tool for
justice, and that characteristic, we presume, is the source of our loyalty.
So, we assume, that when the Constitution clashes with our intuitions of
justice, either the interpretation of the Constitution is wrong, or we
are. 211 There is no occasion to have to “struggle against” the
Constitution. But in reality, our attachment to the Constitution has little
to do with any promise of “perfect justice”—this is a smokescreen.212
We value it for no other reason than because it is ours, and we are in a
relationship with it. We do not approach the Constitution as a stranger.
Thus, we are regularly faced with a situation where we must protest the
Constitution—not a false vision of the Constitution, not a corruption of
the Constitution, but the Constitution as it is presented to us, a credible
claimant to the legitimate Constitution.
B. Constitutional Exiles
One of the great heroes of the American quest for racial equality was
W.E.B. Du Bois. Born in 1868 in western Massachusetts, Du Bois
attended Harvard University and became the first Black man to earn a
doctorate from that institution. He quickly emerged as a powerful
intellectual force within the Black community and the nation as a
whole, helping found the Niagara Movement and later the NAACP.
Du Bois’s most prominent work, The Souls of Black Folk, came
relatively early in his long career (published in 1903). 213 Though Du
Bois was known for being more aggressive in the pursuit of full civil
and political equality than the dominant Black leadership of the day
(exemplified by Booker T. Washington), Souls had a conciliatory tone,
accepting the good faith of Whites 214 and the temporary legitimacy of
certain suffrage restrictions on poor, uneducated Blacks, 215 in the
211. See Magliocca, supra note 198, at 725.
212. Indeed, our veneration occurs despite the fact that most Americans know very little about
the Constitution or what it protects. See NAT’L CONSTITUTION CTR., STARTLING LACK OF
CONSTITUTIONAL KNOWLEDGE REVEALED IN NATIONAL CONSTITUTION CENTER SURVEY (Sept.
15, 1997). See also MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE
CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE 3 (1986) (“[T]he Constitution occupies an anomalous
role in American cultural history . . . . [I]t has been swathed in pride yet obscured by
indifference: a fulsome rhetoric of reverence more than offset by the reality of ignorance.”).
213. W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK (Penguin Classics 1996) (1903).
214. See id. at 48 (“The present generation of Southerners are not responsible for the past, and
they should not be blindly hated or blamed for it.”). See also id. at 144 (“[I]f the representatives
of the best white Southern public opinion were the ruling and guiding powers in the South to-day
the conditions indicated would be fairly well fulfilled.”)
215. See id. at 33 (calling such suffrage restrictions the decision “every sensible man, black
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course of making a powerful argument for a vision of liberal democratic
equality that included persons of all races. Twenty years of little
progress later, Du Bois was far less sanguine when he wrote
Darkwater. 216 Though still promoting a basic vision of democratic
equality, Du Bois had no interest in presuming White magnanimity, and
had transitioned into more of a cultural nationalist outlook. 217 He
denied entirely that White America was even attempting to act in the
best interests of Blacks218 and held that White racism was the norm, not
the exception, in the American Republic. 219 Yet again, this position
failed him. After World War II, Du Bois began to find Communism
increasingly attractive. 220
This intellectual journey was not due to dilettantism. Rather, it was
emblematic of a man who desperately was searching for a way to
include Blacks in the full vision of the American people, only to find his
hopes dashed again and again over the course of his long career. He
dedicated his considerable intellectual firepower against the problem of
White racism; from his vantage point, White racism proved impervious.
And so it was that in 1961, at age ninety-three, Du Bois left America to
reside in Ghana. He wrote, “I just cannot take any more of this
country’s treatment. We leave for Ghana October 5th and I set no date
for return. . . . Chin up, and fight on, but realize that American Negroes
can’t win.” 221 He died in Ghana in 1963, one day before Martin Luther
King’s “I Have a Dream” speech.
Du Bois’s story is an American tragedy. Though not a lawyer, he
was a person who believed in America’s covenant even as America
refused to include him in it. The vast majority of Du Bois’s life was

and white” would have made in the wake of the Civil War).
216. W.E.B. DU BOIS, DARKWATER: VOICES FROM WITHIN THE VEIL (1920).
217. Darkwater was published one year after Du Bois spoke at the Second Pan-African
Congress in Paris, where he applied the principle of national self-determination that was
ascendant in Europe to persons of African descent. See Anthony Dawahare, Langston Hughes’s
Radical Poetry and the “End of Race,” 23 MELUS 21, 24 (1998) (describing how the 1920s gave
Pan-Africanists a strategic opportunity to construct and “valorize” the Pan-African identity).
218. DU BOIS, DARKWATER, supra note 216, at 146 (attacking the presumption “that white
people not only know better what Negroes need than Negroes themselves, but that they are
anxious to supply these needs” (emphasis added)).
219. See id. at 39 (“This is not Europe gone mad; this is not aberration nor insanity; this is
Europe; this seeming Terrible is the real soul of white culture.”)
220. See W.E.B. DU BOIS: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 197 (Gerald Horne & Mary Young eds., 2001)
(quoting Du Bois as saying, “I believe in communism. I mean by communism a planned way of
life in the production of wealth and work designed for building a state whose object is the highest
welfare of its people and not merely the profit of a part.”).
221. THE WORLD OF W.E.B. DU BOIS: A QUOTATION SOURCEBOOK 15 (Meyer Weinberg ed.,
1992).
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dedicated not to renouncing America, but rather seeking to hold
America to its promises because for all of his country’s shortcomings, it
was still his country. It was a project he dedicated himself to heart and
soul, even in the face of continual rejection by the very normative
political order to which he was appealing back. Yet he persisted. Ten
years before his final departure, Du Bois still could not contemplate the
idea of abandoning America entirely, writing, “This is my native land. I
shall never live elsewhere. I could not if I would. I would not if I
could.” 222
Du Bois’s Herculean efforts to reform America by any means
imaginable is difficult to contemplate in terms of dominant political
theory. To be sure, the attachment that Du Bois had to America is
different in important ways from that held by members of the dominant
groups. 223 Still, if America was such a perpetual failure in its (un)equal
treatment of Blacks, why did Du Bois feel any attachment at all? 224
Cover tells us that “[d]eeds of violence are rarely suffered by the victim
apart from a setting of domination” (either explicit or implicit). 225 But
he seems only half right. While Du Bois’s inability to alter the
constitutional narrative of racist exclusion was undoubtedly a result of
the violent power possessed by the legal bodies (courts, judges, and
executives) that maintained the system, Du Bois always had the
opportunity to leave. Burt’s account of the Bible’s political theory,
though, proves instructive: “The Bible differs from the dominant strand
in modern political theory in presuming the prior existence of a
relationship between ruler and ruled. Modern theory, for its part, is
preoccupied with the initiation of a relationship” (p. 170). Like the
relationship enjoyed between humankind and God in the Bible, we do
not come to the Constitution ex nihilo—we come to it as an integral part
of our political and social community. We possess, in a very real sense,
a relationship with it. “Biblical theory thus directly confronts a problem
that modern theory essentially ignores—how to resume the relationship
after breach, always assuming that both ruler and ruled for their own
reasons want a resumption” (pp. 170–71).
222. Id.
223. Compare BALKIN, supra note 188, at 109 (“[M]ost citizens have an emotional stake in
the basic justice of our present constitutional institutions, even if they disagree about specific
elements.”), with Dorothy E. Roberts, The Meaning of Blacks’ Fidelity to the Constitution, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1761, 1763 (1997) (describing Black fidelity to the Constitution as emerging
from a recognition of their outsider status coupled with a demand that they be included, and a
belief that one day they would be).
224. See Roberts, supra note 223, at 1762 (noting that, if anything, the Constitution should be
the subject of cynicism and contempt amongst Blacks, not fidelity).
225. Cover, Nomos, supra note 179, at 1616.
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Du Bois represents what I call a “constitutional exile.” An exile is a
person who has been turned out or expelled by the community she
identifies with and considers herself a part of. This is in contrast to an
immigrant, who voluntarily decides to leave for another shore because
she imagines she will have a better life there. The language of exile is
meant to evoke not just the fact that there exists in any constitutional
vision winners and losers. Rather, it hopefully gets at the sense of
anguish and longing that the exile feels, stemming from a sense of
rejection, even betrayal. 226 A constitutional exile is someone who
thinks of herself as encompassed within our constitutional covenant, but
whose membership is rejected by the prevailing constitutional order—
the constitution in practice. 227 She rejects the choice that she either
accepts her excluded status or leave, 228 because she rejects the claim
that the proper functioning of her communal nomos requires that her
dissenting claim not be entertained.
The concept of constitutional exiles comes at the intersection of three
related claims. The first is that the Constitution is an important (if not
the most important) cultural setting with respect to identifying as an
American. 229 That is why constitutional contestation is so important
even for people who, like Du Bois, are physically capable of exit. The
second is that the Constitution is open to contestation—it does not admit
a single orthodoxy, it is not “love it (as it is) or leave it.” 230 That is how
we can recognize the intelligibility of claims like Du Bois’s even though
226. Former Sixth Circuit Judge and civil rights icon Nathaniel Jones phrased post-Brown
developments in school desegregation as a “betrayal.” Nathaniel R. Jones, The Judicial Betrayal
of Blacks—Again: The Supreme Court’s Destruction of the Hopes Raised by Brown v. Board of
Education, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 101 (2004). It is an interesting choice of words, because it
connotes a trust that was abused, and, as Dorothy Roberts points out, Blacks had no particular
reason to trust the Constitution or the Supreme Court in the first place. Roberts, supra note 223,
at 1762. Prior advances, though, allowed Black leaders like Judge Jones to have faith—it put
them in the position of White Americans who always could indulge fully in the faith of the
Divine Constitution.
227. See Sunder, supra note 174, at 508 (“Cultural dissenters are presumed to be either
voluntary members of a culture despite the culture’s discriminatory norms, or free to exit the
cultural group if equality is more important to them.” (footnote omitted)).
228. See Martha C. Nussbaum, A Plea for Difficulty, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR
WOMEN? 105, 114 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999) (arguing that we should respect the decision
of, for example, a woman to remain in a religious sect that prevents women from becoming
priests as part of our general commitment to social pluralism); William N. Eskridge Jr., A
Jurisprudence of “Coming Out”: Religion, Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and
Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411, 2455 (1997) (affirming the permissibility
of discrimination within social groups because of the right to exit).
229. See supra Part III.A.
230. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 29 (1973) (noting that an
essential part of identifying culture as meanings is that these meanings are “essentially
contestable”).
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such claims may dissent (and dissent largely unsuccessfully) against the
prevailing order. The third is that there is an inherent tension between
the self-conception of the exile, who views herself as arguing from
within the communal tradition, and her description by the dominant
cultural players, who present her as a heretic willfully excluding herself
from the “established” boundaries of the community. 231 That is why
(and how) the exile is forced out in the first place—her claims pose
danger to the contemporary (or preferred) ordering of the constitutional
dynamic, one that invariably has its own promoters and defenders.232
And the dominant view can eat away at the confidence of the exile—
there is always the inclination to believe that the most fervent defenders
of the dominant constitutional order possess a superior faith and fidelity
than the doubters. 233
Those who extol the virtues of popular constitutional change
obviously know of the gap between holders of dominant and dissident
constitutional norms. Their story is, after all, one that praises the ability
of the formerly-fringe to achieve mainstream acceptance. 234 But I fear
that in all the exuberance that surrounds the capacity of the people to
create real, lasting change in our constitutional reality, we miss
something important regarding the perspective of the dissidents. When
I read stories like Balkin’s, the imagery that comes to mind is freshfaced volunteers singing songs as they mobilize and march off to war
against injustice. Alternatively, one can imagine a sentiment of grim
determination as a beleaguered minority commits themselves to a cause
they do not truly expect to win, but upon which they are willing to
martyr themselves—their commitment runs that deep. 235 However the
battle turns out, the combatants possess moral clarity, if nothing else.
But the terrain upon which this battle is fought creates a demoralizing
unease, because the dissidents are not struggling against a strange entity
231. Gordon, supra note 193, at 109 (“[T]he power exerted by a legal regime consists less in
the force that it can bring to bear against violators of its rules than in its capacity to persuade
people that the world described in its images and categories is the only attainable world in which
a sane person would want to live. ‘Either this world,’ legal actions are always implicitly
asserting, ‘some slightly amended version of this world, or the Deluge.’”).
232. Cf. BALKIN, supra note 188, at 58 (discussing “strategic dis-identification” with
reference to “the Hebrews who revolted against Moses’s leadership in the desert (and were slain
as a result)”). That these Israelites are now considered to be part of an external “they” rather than
“we” is fraught with meaning given the interpretation of Korach (the leader of this “revolt”) in the
concluding section. See infra notes 297–308 and accompanying text.
233. See WIESEL, supra note 105, at 160–61 (exploring the consequences of the misguided
belief that God’s defense attorney has a special connection to God that would allow him to
intercede on behalf of the threatened Jews).
234. See BALKIN, supra note 188, at 97–98.
235. See Cover, Violence, supra note 181, at 1604–05.
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they only know as evil. Rather, they are struggling against (what has a
legitimate claim to be the authoritative construction of) an entity they
themselves value—the Constitution. Even the “enemy Constitution”
thus exerts normative force. Faith is not just the belief that we can
change the Constitution to match our conception of justice; it is also a
strong sense that the Constitution has something to teach us about
justice. Alternative visions of justice spring up in response to
constitutional shortcomings, but these visions are immediately
threatened by constitutional veneration—a dissonance between
competing sources of political commitments. There is always a sense
that one is committing a form of “adultery” against an institution that
one truly does think of as important. 236 If the Constitution exhibited no
pull on us but for its harmonious coexistence with our own conceptions
of justice, we would feel no dissonance at all. But because our
relationship with the Constitution exists independent of its capacity for
perfect justice, even as it speaks to us in terms of covenantal ethics, we
are left reeling. Consequently, it is difficult—not impossible, but
difficult—to maintain an oppositional outlook for long stretches. Either
one abandons the faith entirely, or one recants and accepts the orthodox
picture.
This Review previously discussed the sense of “anguish” that comes
from feeling written out of one’s own community and nomos, using the
example of Halakhically-committed gay Jews. 237 In the United States,
the Constitution serves as a critical benchmark of the borders of this
community—the entire idea of who “the people” are is mediated
through a “constitutional structure” that delineates those individuals
who enjoy the “rights and privileges of citizenship.” 238 Consequently,
there is an especially raw hurt that emerges when the dominant
purveyor of constitutional meaning declares that what one takes to be an
essential element of one’s equal standing in the polity is not, in fact,
covered by the charter. 239 If, as Balkin argues, the process of
236. See BALKIN, supra note 188, at 103 (“What judge, lawyer, or law professor wants to be
thought of as unfaithful to the Constitution? Who wants to be known as a constitutional
adulterer?”).
237. See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text.
238. Melvin L. Rogers, The People, Rhetoric, and Affect: On the Political Force of Du Bois’s
The Souls of Black Folk, 106 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 188, 188 (2012).
239. Though I am taking the Supreme Court to be generally understood as the dominant
purveyor of constitutional meaning, it does not have to be. It may be that a broadly held popular
conception of the Constitution holds more sway in the public imagination than an unpopular
Supreme Court decision. See BALKIN, supra note 188, at 237. But this does not mean that there
are not minorities who are left lacking an authoritative constitutional narrative to validate their
claims; it just means they are on the outside looking in against a different source of authoritative
interpretation.

7_SCHRAUB.DOCX

2013]

4/18/2013 11:25 AM

Our Divine Constitution

1255

“constitutional redemption” (whereby a constitution abolishes slavery,
protects civil rights, and engages in other laudatory acts) allows “we the
people” to claim credit for these triumphs, 240 then the refusal of the
Constitution to encompass a particular rights vision also is understood
by its victims as a decision by “we the people” to pass those persons by.
Often times this harm may be blunted by the prospect of legislative
reform. 241 Even if the Constitution does not provide protections to
certain groups, the legislature is always available to ride to the rescue.
Note the implicit belief that the Constitution never requires the wrong.
But even where one is (capable of being) protected by democratic
politics, there is a special feature of being a subject of constitutional
protection—not just that it makes it harder to hurt you, but that it is seen
as part of our constitutive charter that one cannot rightfully be hurt.
Hence, the great sense of woundedness when one is written out of
constitutional protections, and the great efforts expended to give life to
these constitutional protections. This is why the wrong done by state
court decisions legitimating the ban on gay marriage, for example, is not
entirely rectified when they are reversed by statute. 242 There is a
qualitative distinction between having protection simply because a
potentially transient majority accedes to it, and having protection
because the foundational charter of the community refuses to
contemplate that you come to harm. This does not mean courts are
properly tasked to “right every wrong, suture every societal wound, and
correct every injustice.” 243 But it does mean that we recognize the
totality of what courts are, in fact, refraining from doing when they elect
to withdraw from a given field. 244
Burt’s presentation of the Constitution and Supreme Court as

240. Id. at 31.
241. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993) (“‘The Constitution
presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually
be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no
matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.’” (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440
U.S. 93, 97 (1979))).
242. See, e.g., Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007) (upholding Maryland’s ban on
same-sex marriage), abrogated by 2012 Md. Laws 2, codified at MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2201 (repealing, effective 2013, the ban on same-sex marriage).
243. Gerald E. Rosen, The Hard Part of Judging, 34 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 9 (2000).
244. See BALKIN, supra note 188, at 135–37. This also serves as a counterweight to Burt’s
preference that courts be circumspect in their efforts to fiat resolution to polarizing social
controversies. Burt would prefer that the Court act as a “rainbow,” reminding Americans of our
covenantal obligation so we have the opportunity to resolve the injustice ourselves (pp. 318–23).
I am not necessarily opposed to that vision, but I do want to emphasize that even successful
democratic action is not a complete substitute for vigorous constitutional protection, given the
unique role our Constitution plays in our construction of moral responsibilities.
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analogous to the previously established divine/mortal biblical dynamic
does not directly tackle this problem. His paradigm case is Cooper v.
Aaron, 245 which was the first significant judicial response to the
problem of “massive resistance” by the southern states to the Court’s
landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education 246 (p. 304). The
Court cast its opinion as a steadfast defense against the rebellious
southern states waging “war against the Constitution.” 247 God (played
by the Court) has issued a definitive interpretation of the Torah
(Constitution), against which the people (Governor Faubus) are
rebelling. For Burt, Cooper is an appealing analogy to the failure of
God’s “command-and-punish” authority (p. 303)—it represents the
apex of the Court’s presentation of itself as infallible and
unchallengeable, even as it was coming under unprecedented assault,
which clearly elucidated the Court’s structural weaknesses in actually
translating its demands into practice. 248 Even after Cooper, the Court
finds that it is unable to simply will racial equality into reality. 249 Yet
in the face of this intransigent resistance, the Court finds an alternative
source of power—not infinite and unquestioned authority—but an
ability to shine light on grievances hitherto ignored, reminding us of the
gap between our promises and our practices (p. 314). 250
But this narrative only deals with half of the question. From our
modern vantage point, nobody has sympathy for the rebels in Cooper,
and so we root for the insurrection to be crushed. The God-actor, the
Supreme Court, is on the side of the angels, and while Burt’s account
problematizes the God/Court’s power, it leaves untouched its
righteousness. Although Burt rejects the claim that the Court possesses
“exclusive interpretive authority,” this stance stems from his belief that
the “putative wrongdoer [must be] brought to acknowledge the norm [of
justice] and his violation of it” (p. 325). Burt characterizes this as a
practical problem in bringing about the real world remediation of

245. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
246. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
247. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18.
248. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“It proves incontestably, that
the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power . . . .”);
GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?
(2d ed. 2008) (examining the ability of the Court to effectuate liberal change).
249. See Cover, Violence, supra note 181, at 1612 (“[B]ridging the chasm between thought
and action in the legal system is never simply a matter of will.”).
250. Like with Cooper, Burt has issues with the other two cases discussed in this section of
his book, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), but
they are also with the process and rhetoric the Court uses, not a belief that the Court was actively
instantiating an injustice.
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injustice, with the underlying assumption—that what the Court and
what the Constitution does is at root just—remaining untouched. But
the Court does not always speak for justice. Sometimes the rebels have
the better argument—and then the question becomes how to rectify the
relationship when the “divine” organs of the state are being used to
suppress rightful dissidents.
Consider instead the Court’s more recent decision in Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District #1.251
Parents Involved was, at its root, a dispute over the proper meaning of a
canonical text in the corpus of American constitutional law—Brown v.
Board of Education.252 The critical question was whether Brown’s
ideal was either integrated schools or color-blind student allocation
schemes. For Chief Justice Roberts, it was the latter: “Before Brown,
schoolchildren were told where they could and could not go to school
based on the color of their skin.” 253 Justice Thomas referred back to the
arguments made by the attorneys in Brown to claim that the “color-blind
Constitution . . . was the rallying cry for the lawyers who litigated
Brown.” 254
By contrast, Justice Breyer claimed the decision
“threaten[ed] the promise of Brown,” 255 and Justice Stevens sharply
took issue with Chief Justice Roberts’s incomplete rendering of the
historical record: “the history books do not tell stories of white children
struggling to attend black schools.” 256
Solely as a question of history, there is little doubt regarding the
opinions of the Brown attorneys—Thurgood Marshall made clear his
opposition to a rigid colorblind Constitution in his Bakke opinion, 257
and the surviving attorneys from Brown reacted to the Parents Involved
decision with undisguised dismay. 258 As far as they were concerned,
the proper understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment (and the one
that had held sway in the courts in the first few decades after Brown)
had been abandoned in favor of a viewpoint unrelentingly hostile to true
251. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
252. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
253. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 747 (plurality opinion).
254. Id. at 772 (Thomas, J., concurring).
255. Id. at 867–68 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
257. See 438 U.S. 265, 387 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting) (rejecting the claim that universities cannot use race in the course of remedying a
history of racial discrimination).
258. See Adam Liptak, The Same Words, but Differing Views, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/29/us/29assess.html (collecting quotes from Brown attorneys
calling the decision “preposterous,” “100 percent wrong,” and “stand[ing] [Brown’s] argument on
its head”). Chief Roberts confidently stated in his opinion that “history will be heard,” Parents
Involved, 551 U.S. at 746, and so it was—quickly.
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racial equality. 259 Even though Parents Involved was hardly an outlier
in terms of contemporary judicial treatment of desegregation, 260 the
case went a step further because it blocked the voluntary, democratic
effort by the community to achieve student integration (in a former
slave state, no less!). 261 Even if that spark was isolated to only a few
cities, snuffing it out “takes away some hope . . . [and] it is no small
thing to dash hope.” 262
But from the vantage point of the Brown attorneys, the even more
damaging result of Parents Involved was its attempt to inscribe a vision
of a sacred American value (“equal protection”) that was directly
contrary to what they took to be the core principles of racial justice. If,
as Cover puts it, courts respond to “luxuriant growth of a hundred legal
traditions” by “assert[ing] that this one is law and destroy[ing] or
try[ing] to destroy the rest,” 263 the very vision of constitutional equality
as it had been understand by the civil rights movement had just been
placed directly in the Court’s crosshairs. Or worse, if the Constitution
only bars evil, then the civil rights ambition was being recoded as the
sort of behavior that one could not justly do to one’s fellows—a
violation of “equal protection.” The law is one source that teaches us
what our social duties are towards one another. 264 Indeed, that is often
the point of judicial opinions—they are designed to instill in the public
a sense of our common creed and values as Americans. 265 The panic
259. See 551 U.S. at 803 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Court has changed significantly since
it decided School Comm. of Boston in 1968. It was then more faithful to Brown and more
respectful of our precedent than it is today. It is my firm conviction that no Member of the Court
that I joined in 1975 would have agreed with today’s decision.”). For a more thorough
exploration of how the meaning of Brown drifted such that it became an obstacle, rather than an
instrument, of its progenitors vision of racial equality, see David Schraub, Sticky Slopes, 101
CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at Part III.C).
260. See James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV. L. REV.
131, 142 (2007) (“[T]he reality is that the Court has not issued a significant, favorable opinion
regarding school desegregation in about thirty years.”).
261. In a sense, it was democratic bodies “riding to the rescue” against court rulings
dramatically circumscribing the conditions where school integration was constitutionally
mandatory, and the Supreme Court heading them off at the pass. See supra note 241 and
accompanying text.
262. Ryan, supra note 260, at 133.
263. Cover, Nomos, supra note 179, at 53.
264. See Menachem Mautner, Three Approaches to Law and Culture, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
839, 852 (2011) (“[T]he constitutive approach holds that law, by its participation in the
constitution of culture, also participates in the creation of the mind categories through which
individuals perceive the social relations in which they take part—i.e., their status vis-a-vis other
individuals, what others are entitled to do to them, what they are entitled to do to others, and the
self-perceived identities of individuals and groups.”).
265. Justice Kennedy, speaking at Harvard Law School, related a story about how his
concurrence in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), changed the outlook of an outraged citizen
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caused by Parents Involved is not just the tangible fact that Seattle and
Louisville cannot voluntary integrate their schools, but the prospect that
our citizenry will come to understand the project of school integration
as an evil itself. 266
I do not mean to suggest that people stand passive and awestruck in
the face of assertions of constitutional meaning. 267 People find creative
ways to harmonize their commitments with the law in front of them.268
But the law and its defenders are allowed to be creative back, 269 and so
maintaining a position as an exile is difficult. Even Du Bois was broken
(after ninety-plus years of struggle), and not every person is W.E.B. Du
Bois. It is one thing to assert we should be “protestant” in our
constitutional interpretation practices; 270 it is another thing to hold to
who, as a prisoner of war in Germany, had risked a great deal to knit and preserve an American
flag. Justice Kennedy concluded his remarks by saying: “The Constitution is the enduring and
common link that we have as Americans and it is something that we must teach to and transmit to
the next generation. Judges are teachers. By our opinions, we teach.” Lani Guinier,
Demosprudence through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (2008).
266. We might be skeptical that seasoned civil rights warriors will come to doubt their
positions simply due to Supreme Court say-so. But social movement accounts of constitutional
change sometimes minimize the fact that, in many social controversies, large swaths of the
American polity are simply neutral, and form their opinions based on signals sent by credible elite
actors. See JOHN R. ZALLER, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINIONS 14 (1992); PAUL R.
BREWER, VALUE WAR: PUBLIC OPINION AND THE POLITICS OF GAY RIGHTS 69–71 (2008). See
also Schraub, supra note 259, at Part II.B.
I believe, though I cannot prove, that the implicitly understood moral indictment present in a
hostile constitutional ruling accounts for the anger one sees in Justice Scalia’s Romer and
Lawrence dissents. When the Court says laws that express disapproval towards homosexuals are
violations of equal protection or due process, they are telling a considerable section of Americans
(including, I imagine, Justice Scalia) that their deeply held moral commitments are at
fundamental odds with our national charter. That when they register a belief in the immorality of
gays and lesbians, they are acting against defining American values. And they know that
enshrining this judgment through an actor with the signaling strength of the United States
Supreme Court will have quite an impact on the mostly-neutral middle—persons whose views
about homosexuality are not deeply held and are heavily reliant on how various positions are
reflected in surrounding culture. See David Schraub, The Perils and Promise of the Holder
Memo, 2012 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 187, 200.
267. See Mautner, supra note 264, at 856 (“[P]eople are not passively governed by law.
Rather, as shown by many culture researchers, human beings are creative, manipulative, and
enterprising. Therefore, the constitutive approach views individuals as often taking action to
obstruct law’s imperatives and its allocation of rights and powers.”).
268. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, Forbidden Conversations: On Race, Privacy, and
Community (A Continuing Conversation with John Ely on Racism and Democracy), 114 YALE
L.J. 1353, 1396 (2005) (proposing that, given judicial hostility to both affirmative action and
school integration programs, “universities, as part of their affirmative action programs and in
pursuit of their goal of admitting students knowledgeable about and experienced in issues of
diversity, might prefer both black and white students who had attended integrated schools”).
269. Schraub, supra note 259, at 51–52.
270. See LEVINSON, supra note 184, at 29 (defining the “protestant” position with respect to
constitutional interpretation as affirming “the legitimacy of individualized (or at least

7_SCHRAUB.DOCX

1260

4/18/2013 11:25 AM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 44

that commitment in a meaningful fashion in the face of sustained
orthodox efforts to suppress these alternatives. Constitutional divinity
creates a sense of vertigo, as the exile attempts to maintain the
conjunction between her dissident interpretation of the creed and her
standing within a community that defines its constitution by reference to
its justness. 271 One can protest, of course, but one has to fight past the
inevitable retort: “If we are wrong, the Supreme Court of this nation is
wrong.” 272
Dominant purveyors of constitutional meaning—assisted by our
veneration of institutions like the Supreme Court, which possess a
privileged position in articulating that meaning—attempt to squelch the
sustenance of these heretical constitutional visions. 273 Law, backed by
violence, attempts to force its targets to renounce their alternative vision
of the world in favor of one imposed by those in power. 274 Indeed, this
would seem to be the message of more conventional readings of the
Book of Job, where raw power eventually bludgeons Job into
submission, forcing the renunciation of his most deeply cherished
commitments in the face of overwhelming force.
To be clear, like Cover, I agree that the enforcement through violence
of particular moral or cultural prescriptions is not necessarily a bad
thing—“[v]ery often the balance of terror in this regard is just as I
would want it.” 275 That Governor Faubus was eventually forced to
yield to the rifles and bayonets of the National Guard is a good
outcome, and plenty of times it is someone like Governor Faubus who is

nonhierarchical communal) interpretation”); BALKIN, supra note 188, at 10 (arguing that
“constitutional legitimacy” depends on “constitutional protestantism”).
271. Ironically enough, this may become more difficult the more often the Constitution does
properly instantiate norms of justice. If one thinks that the Constitution sanctions a great many
injustices, one is unlikely to be dazzled by claims of constitutional omnibenevolence. By
contrast, if one generally sees the Constitution as presently articulating a just world, there is
greater dissonance when trying to argue the exception. See JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT
TIME 115 (1963) (describing African-Americans’ “great advantage of having never believed that
collection of myths to which white Americans cling”).
272. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Address to 1st Montgomery Improvement Association Mass
Meeting, at Holt Street Baptist Church (Dec. 5, 1955) (transcript available at http://mlkkpp01.stanford.edu/index.php/kingpapers/article/address_to_first_montgomery_improvement_ass
ociation_mia_mass_meeting_at_hol/).
273. See Post, supra note 177, at 56 (“When constitutional law intervenes in an ongoing
cultural dispute about the meaning of the Constitution, it both draws strength from those who
agree with the Court’s vision of the Constitution and displaces the views of those who disagree
with the Court’s understanding.”).
274. See Cover, Violence, supra note 181, at 1603 (drawing an analogy to the practice of
torture, and the torturer’s typical demand that the victim engage in an act of betrayal to solidify
the end of the victim’s nomos and its replacement by one created by the torturer).
275. Id. at 1608.
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registering the protest. But that was the outcome; though sometimes
less starkly demonstrated, it describes the balance of power between
(dissident) citizen and state, and insofar as we can conceptualize the
existence of sympathetic constitutional exiles, it drives home the gravity
of the situation they are in.
C. Protest and the Divine Constitution
“Fidelity to the Constitution,” Jack Balkin writes, “requires faith in
the Constitution.” 276 Otherwise, why bother? If one does not believe in
at least the potential for the Constitution to create and sustain a just
social order, then the proper move is to abandon it, not reform it. 277 In
order to use authority, a constitution must first gain authority. 278
Having gained authority, it must maintain it. If everyone abandons the
law, it is a literal dead letter. Law depends on the faith of its subjects
that it can adequately account for their experience and values. Law “is
given cogency and support by the ongoing story of the community that
seeks to live by the law.” 279
The narrative meaning that sustains law can also be deployed to
“speak back” against it. 280 This is not because the narrative bears only
one conclusion that the law is “violating”—much the opposite, it is
because the narrative has many conclusions that the law cannot wholly
contain. 281 The law is not intrinsically just, but neither is it intrinsically
unjust. Constitutional faith is predicated on the belief that the law can
be appealed to in the language of justice. 282 In making this appeal, we
do not discover the “true” Constitution. We do, however, exert an
276. BALKIN, supra note 188, at 2 (emphasis omitted).
277. William Lloyd Garrison did not revere the Constitution; he attacked it as “a covenant
with death, and an agreement with hell.” Id. at 5. If one truly believes that the Constitution is
unsalvageable in its evil, then there is no reason to grant it any respect whatsoever. More
recently, Louis Michael Seidman has argued passionately in favor of “constitutional
disobedience,” concluding that the Constitution is so irredeemably flawed as a document that we
should, in many cases, stop paying heed to it. LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL
DISOBEDIENCE 9–10 (2012).
278. WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 5 (1867).
279. Tucker, supra note 134, at 19. See also Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125
HARV. L. REV. 2011, 2016 (2012) (“The Constitution is law today because it continues to be
accepted today.”).
280. Adler, supra note 8, at 184 (“It is always possible, therefore, that the meaningcomponent upon which law depends will rise to accuse it . . . .”).
281. See Cover, Nomos, supra note 179, at 18 (“Precepts must ‘have meaning,’ but they
necessarily borrow it from materials created by social activity that is not subject to the strictures
of provenance that characterize what we call formal lawmaking.”).
282. See BALKIN, supra note 188, at 121 (“Our Constitution is like ourselves, deficient,
fallible, a collection of moral and political compromises, yet with the urge and the ambition to
become better than it is now.”).
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impact upon it that holds out the possibility of change, hopefully change
for the better. 283
1. Success
Law is not unchanging, and formal amendment processes are not the
only way law evolves. Scholars who have examined the impact of
social movements on legal development have persuasively argued that
legal meaning is responsive to pressure put upon it by mass movements.
For example, Reva Siegel argues that even though the Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA) was never actually ratified, the mobilization that
surrounded the issue of women’s rights nonetheless exhibited a
dramatic impact on the Supreme Court’s sex jurisprudence, giving us a
“de facto ERA.” 284 The shifts in abortion jurisprudence in the years
following Roe v. Wade 285 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey 286 offer a
similar template of popular mobilization leading to noticeable doctrinal
change.
If one views the Constitution as a purely positivist document, this
evolution is hard to justify. The entire point of positivism is to try and
separate “the ‘legal’ question of what law is from the moral or political
questions of what law ought to be.” 287 Certainly, as a theoretical matter
this understanding of the constitutional role has widespread appeal—
both in the public and in the courts. 288 But the fact that we can observe
283. See id. at 119 (rejecting the idea that the Constitution is inherently just, while arguing
that the belief in its potential justice allows us to “manufacture” fidelity to it). As Patricia
Williams wrote with respect to how American Blacks viewed the promise of constitutional rights:
To say that blacks never fully believed in rights is true. Yet it is also true that blacks
believed in them so much and so hard that we gave them life where there was none
before; we held onto them, put the hope of them into our wombs, mothered them and
not the notion of them.
PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 163 (1992).
284. See generally Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and
Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323 (2006).
285. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
286. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
287. Steven D. Smith, Why Should Courts Obey the Law?, 77 GEO. L.J. 113, 123 (1988). See
also JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF THE
STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE 184 (5th ed. 1998) (objecting to “the prevailing tendency to confound
what is with what ought to be law”).
288. See, e.g., John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, The Myth of Legality and Public
Evaluation of the Supreme Court, 81 SOC. SCI. Q. 928, 935 (2000) (“Not only is the ‘legal’ factor
a significant predictor of court evaluation . . . , but . . . beliefs that the Court makes its decisions
on the basis of ideology, partisanship, or pressure from the other institutions significantly detract
from evaluation of the Court.”); Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A
Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 272–73 (1997) (“There
is a widespread belief, held by the courts themselves, that the legitimacy of judicial
decisionmaking depends upon the belief that it is based on precedent and not politics.”).
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social-driven constitutional change indicates that the American people
are not satisfied with a purely positivist constitution.
In part, this may be a result of conceptual difficulties: the very project
of having a legal system implies some judgments about the rule of law,
enforceability of legal mandates, democratic accessibility, and other like
questions. 289 But in part, it is also because many legal questions—even
in their positivist dimensions—carry with them a key normative core.290
Courts are asked to decide what constitutes “equal protection,” what
process is “due,” what punishments are “cruel and unusual.” It is
difficult to even conceive of how to approach such questions without at
least speaking to the moral commitments that undergird such legal
clauses. Finally, Michael Perry argues that Americans believe strongly
in the existence of a moral code beyond the vagaries of day-to-day
politics; one they expect the courts to enforce even in absence of a clear
textual or originalist mandate to do so. 291 When courts abstain from
this endeavor, it is far from clear that the average citizen will be
satisfied by the apologia that the courts are simply calling balls and
strikes. The vision of judges making decisions completely disconnected
from whether they are just in some ethical sense may be abstractly
appealing, but there is little evidence that its popularity persists when its
effects are made concrete. 292
Hence, the whole reason that social-driven constitutional change is
even possible is because of a particular sort of understanding of the
Constitution and our relationship to it that echoes Burt’s conception of
God and the Jewish people’s relationship to him. The reason these
arguments have even a chance at succeeding is because we do not see
the Constitution as existing external to our own considerations of
289. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 184–85 (1991) (arguing that
the Constitution is generally agnostic to questions of values except via providing structures
through which our political morality can be effectively instantiated). See also JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (arguing that judicial
review is justified when necessary to preserve an open democratic process); LON L. FULLER, THE
MORALITY OF LAW 34–38 (1964) (presenting various norms and policies that need to in place for
a purportedly “legal” system to be recognizable as one).
290. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE
LAW 6–12 (2004) (observing that it is difficult to understand why law regulates and proscribes
what it does without referring back to some account of emotional and moral appraisals);
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 8 (1986) (“[E]very
branch of doctrine must rely tacitly if not explicitly upon some picture of the forms of human
association that are right and realistic in the areas of social life with which it deals.”).
291. MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 97–102
(1982).
292. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 96 (2003) (observing
that the hostile reaction to the nomination of Judge Robert Bork to the Supreme Court belies the
notion that what the American public desires most of all is a consummate formalist).
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justice. Pro-lifers see Roe as the Constitution instantiating a wrong.
They have mobilized against it, even in the face of Supreme Court
decisions that explicitly tried to declare an end to popular resistance on
the subject. 293 In doing so, they have affected the public’s perception of
the relationship between the Constitution and abortion rights, as well as
the governing Supreme Court doctrine on the subject. 294 The Pro-lifers
have appealed to our structures of constitutional governance of the
language of justice, and consequently have received, to varying degrees,
a considerable retreat from the Roe regime.
2. Failure
The story I have told thus far of protest theology is one of triumph.
Job does not in fact back down, God concedes wrong, and together they
rebuild their relationship in a way that is mutually respectful to both.
One hopes that constitutional protest can work the same way, with even
excluded groups able to use the language of constitutional promise as a
mechanism for mending past wrongs and recreating a covenantal
promise. 295
But it is important to emphasize that these appeals do not necessarily
succeed. Sometimes—perhaps often—the dominant vision successfully
maintains itself in the face of these rebellious challenges. 296 Its power
is often sufficient to crush these alternatives outright, forcing
recantation as God demanded of Job. After all, even if one accepts my
reading of Job that he does eventually prevail, his is not the only story
of the Bible. For Abraham and Moses, the end result is distancing—the
relationship collapses. Burt says that Moses’s decision to strike the
rock rather than speak to it presaged his “divorce” from God (pp. 128–
29). This sets the stage for the Book of Deuteronomy, which is
different from the prior books in that it contains no verbal exchanges
between God and Moses, implying “that some considerable
unaccustomed distance had come between God and Moses—in a way
293. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992) (describing the
Court’s abortion jurisprudence following from Roe as “call[ing] the contending sides of a national
controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the
Constitution”).
294. BALKIN, supra note 188, at 64.
295. See Rogers, supra note 238, at 190 (“The divergence between the people as they were
and as reformers longed for them to be created a space for potentially mending fractures at the
core of the polity, a space in which the political and ethical standing of the excluded might
subsequently be affirmed.”).
296. As a practical matter, it has to succeed at least some of the time—persons living in a
purely paidaic world “would be unstable and sectarian in their social organization, dissociative
and incoherent in their discourse, wary and violent in their interactions.” Cover, Nomos, supra
note 179, at 16.
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reminiscent of the absence of any conversation between God and
Abraham in Genesis after” the Akedah (p. 146).
The biblical tale of Korach (who goes unmentioned in Burt’s book)
provides perhaps the polar opposite account to my rendition of Job.
Korach is portrayed as one of the Bible’s great villains (at least, among
the Israelite people). 297 Balkin takes for granted that Korach is a
wrongdoer—an example to be avoided by “faithful” constitutional
practitioners. 298 Korach, leading a group of community chieftains,
“assembled against Moses,” alleging that he had raised himself up
above the other Israelites even though all were said to be members of a
holy nation. 299 In response, Korach and his fellows were literally
swallowed up by the open earth, 300 an act that was followed by a divine
plague that killed another 14,700 Israelites. 301
Obscured in this account is Korach’s alleged offense. Korach is no
ordinary rabble-rouser. By tradition, he was considered a great sage of
the Torah, 302 and his followers included some of the most prominent
members of the Israelite community. 303 Traditional accounts indicate
that Korach bore a personal grudge against Moses and greatly expanded
the scope of their dispute to cover proper interpretation of several
Biblical commandments. 304 But in the Bible itself, the only claim
Korach makes is that Moses has elevated himself above the rest of the
people Israel, hoarding a coveted position next to God that ought
rightfully be shared with the entire community. There is no threatened
or enacted violence, nor any claims that show facial disrespect to God
or the divine covenant. To the extent that Korach is “rebelling”—and
this is Moses’s framing, not Korach’s 305—it is an intellectual rebellion,
made with words rather than violence. 306
Moses replies to Korach by instructing him to lay out an offering of
incense alongside Moses. Whichever incense offering God chooses,
297. See ALTER, supra note 95 at 762 n.1 (describing Korach as “the archetype of the
presumptuous rebel against just authority”).
298. See supra note 232.
299. Numbers 16:1–3.
300. Numbers 16:31–33.
301. Numbers 16:49.
302. Bamidbar 18:2.
303. LOUIS GINZBERG, LEGENDS OF THE BIBLE 440 (1956).
304. See id at 440–42.
305. See Numbers 16:11 (“For which cause both thou and all thy company are gathered
together against the LORD: and what is Aaron, that ye murmur against him?”). See also
JONATHAN KIRSCH, MOSES: A LIFE 301 (1998) (“Indeed, the essential message of the Bible is
that defiance of Moses and defiance of God were one and the same . . . .”).
306. See Schraub, Our Holy Grandfather, supra note 84 (“Korach, by comparison, resorted to
no weapons and inflicted no casualties. His was an intellectual insurrection . . . .”).
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“he shall be holy.” 307 Given these slanted parameters, the result was
unsurprising: Moses was selected, and Korach was obliterated. In this
way, effectively the sole response given to Korach’s challenge is his
grisly demise—an argumentative style seemingly more appropriate to
Sir Geoffery de Tourneville than the holy divinity. 308 Korach’s fate
demonstrates the gravity of Job’s grim promise: “Though he slay me,
yet will I trust in him: but I will maintain mine own ways before
him.” 309
It is rare for the American republic to respond to dissident voices in
quite so volcanic a fashion. But in less literal terms, Burt’s framing of
the political relationship (reflected through Biblical theory) implicates
how relationships can and cannot persist given vastly asymmetric
power. Job’s argument, for Burt, is that God does have the power (if he
chooses) to squelch dissent entirely. But that power also destroys the
relationship God wants (p. 174). Ultimately, either prospect is a real
possibility. Protest theology holds forth the possibility, but not the
promise, that appeals in terms of justice might succeed. Even where
they fail, though, one can find value in the challenge itself. 310
At least in his lifetime, Du Bois failed in his appeals. It is altogether
unclear whether Frederick Douglass’s faith in the capacity of the
Constitution to secure racial justice has won out over William Lloyd
Garrison’s belief that it was irredeemably corrupted—certainly it did
not before Douglass died. 311 Critical Race Theory as a field developed
because of a belief that racial inequality was reestablishing itself—and
the Constitution itself was enabling the retrenchment. 312 Can we say,
after Parents Involved, that we will see vindication in our lifetimes?
Maybe. Maybe not.

307. Numbers 16:7.
308. To wit: “The clinching proof of my reasoning is that I will cut anyone who argues further
into dogmeat.” JOHN LLOYD & JOHN MITCHINSON, IF IGNORANCE IS BLISS, WHY AREN’T
THERE MORE HAPPY PEOPLE?: SMART QUOTES FOR DUMB TIMES 187 (2009).
309. Job 13:15.
310. See Cover, Violence, supra note 181, at 1604 (“Martyrs insist in the face of
overwhelming force that if there is to be continuing life, it will not be on the terms of the tyrant’s
law.”); Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 379 (1992) (“Mrs. MacDonald
avoided discouragement and defeat because at the point that she determined to resist her
oppression, she was triumphant. Nothing the all-powerful whites could do to her would diminish
her triumph.”).
311. See BALKIN, supra note 188, at 48–50.
312. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 310; Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1331 (1988). For an overview of Critical Race Theory, see RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN
STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (2001).

7_SCHRAUB.DOCX

2013]

4/18/2013 11:25 AM

Our Divine Constitution

1267

3. Restoration
Burt’s book, and his particular articulation of the process by which
humans and God relate to one other, provide us with a new way of
understanding our collective relationship with the Constitution. The
claim that the Constitution occupies a quasi-religious status in American
society is hardly new. But this view is easily tied up in certain orthodox
religious presumptions—that to be a religious divinity is to be perfectly
just—that need challenging. The need to preserve the mystique of the
Constitution renders it opaque and ultimately stunts a full and fruitful
relationship with it. 313 Burt’s theory provides considerably explanatory
force for how we feel about the Constitution—in particular, our
ambivalence when it feels as if the Constitution sanctions grave
injustice. We simultaneously want to reject the premise that the
Constitution can bring about evil (rejecting the legitimacy of even
dominant interpretations that would have this effect), while feeling a
sense of anxiety and fear that these interpretations may well be true—
and thus, that the Constitution has turned against us.
This concern can be dissipated, though not eliminated, by the
recognition that the Constitution is not a static entity—it can and does
change in response to American response. In this way, many potential
constitutional visions all can claim to be constitutionally true—“these
and these.” 314 This cuts both ways—it is not the case that, when the
Constitution acts to exclude or oppress, it is a “fake” or inauthentic
constitution. Our faith is not in the premise that the Constitution,
properly construed, is always just. It is in the belief that the
Constitution can be appealed to in the language of justice—that it will
be responsive to our prayers. The question, then, is how our
relationship with a “divine” Constitution can persist when one does not
believe it must always be just. Doesn’t this concession eliminate its
divinity? Protest theology and Burt both allow us to answer no. We
still can maintain a relationship with a divine constitution—a healthy
and meaningful one—even in the face of challenging admittedly
legitimate constitutional commitments.
Balkin’s vision of a nation of constitutional “protestants” is an
appealing one. But it will be a stilted faith so long as it does not tackle
the presumption that veneration of the Constitution comes because the
313. See BAGEHOT, supra note 278, at 86 (warning that “[w]e must not let in daylight upon
magic”); Greenberg, supra note 49, at 40 (blaming the impoverishment of modern prayer on its
inability to express anger and rage towards God); Magliocca, supra note 198, at 734 (“[L]awyers
often act as if the Constitution is a religious text. And the maintenance of its sanctity is the only
real constraint on what the Supreme Court and theorists like Balkin do.”).
314. See supra note 167.

7_SCHRAUB.DOCX

1268

4/18/2013 11:25 AM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 44

Constitution necessarily instantiates ideals of perfect justice, and that
we revere the Constitution because it represents some abstract ideal of a
social contract. It does not, but that matters less than one might
think. 315 We come to the Constitution not as strangers, but as
partners—partners who care about the fabric of the American covenant
and wish for it to persist. Our tie to the Constitution is not dependent on
it being an emblem of perfect justice, but it is tied to the process by
which we feel as if we can influence it and speak to it, and that it will
respond in turn. Properly situating the origin of our constitutional
commitment allows us to speak freely to the Constitution, without a
feeling of heresy or abandonment. It allows for the relationship to
survive and persist, even when it feels like by all rights the covenant
should be broken.
CONCLUSION
The Bible is a foundational document of Western moral and political
thought. The relationship it forwards between the divine sovereign and
his subjects, as Burt compelling documents, is not one of perfect
harmony—or even the realistic prospect of such harmony. Rather, it is
a deeply confrontational relationship that is characterized by both
parties pressing the other towards just and fair treatment, and both
parties falling short. What keeps the relationship intact is not the
assumption that perfect justice will be achieved, but rather sentiments of
care and concern that make the relationship meaningful and worth
preserving even in spite of its failings. A relationship of this sort,
however, cannot reach its full fruition insofar as we are deceived into
believing that the dominant player’s assertions of reality are intrinsically
just, right, or true. Our relationship is sustainable only insofar as we are
willing to hold our partners to their promises.
Our relationship to our Constitution is quite similar. Like God, we
believe that the Constitution should relate to us justly. Like God,
sometimes it does not, and we are left feeling hurt and betrayed—as in
each case we hold the presumption that the entity speaks in terms of
justice and thus, what we feel in our hearts is a wrong, which is coded to
the public as a right. When placed in this position, one option is to
simply abandon the Constitution as not worth our time—unworthy of
our allegiance because it fails in its core ambition. Yet many of us find
315. Cf. Allison M. Jaggar, Caring as a Feminist Practice of Moral Reason, in JUSTICE AND
CARE: ESSENTIAL READINGS IN FEMINIST ETHICS 179, 180 (Virginia Held ed., 1995) (offering
“care thinking” as an alternative to “justice thinking”—the latter preoccupied with impartial
application of universal principles, the former instead focusing on particular issues made salient
by a posture of “empathy, openness, and receptiveness”).
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ourselves still drawn to the Constitution, for the same reason the postHolocaust Jews have not abandoned Judaism. It is a community of
meaning to us, and we cannot lightly walk away. Standing yet before
the Constitution and attempting to steadfastly maintain faith through
dissent is a difficult endeavor, and one that we must admit has only
mixed success.
I have in the course of this Review analogized constitutional
dissidents to biblical characters ranging from Abraham to Job to
Korach. In our ongoing constitutional drama, we see all of these roles
played. Sometimes we’re Job, ultimately successful in achieving
change and renewal. Sometimes we’re Korach, crushed and devoured
in a raw display of power. Sometimes we’re Abraham, able to stand for
a time to assert what is right, but ultimately falling mute. And
sometimes we’re none of these—we’re Orville Faubus, and we deserve
to lose. 316 The issue here is not how often dominant constitutional
norms are deservedly resisted, any more than the point of protest
theology is to say that God is always or nearly always abusive. It is
simply taking that first step—rejecting that the divine nature of the
Constitution gives it infinite license, then rejecting that this rejection
forces one to abandon the constitutional community as a whole. The
Divine Constitution exhibits a pull on us because it is our constitution
and constitutive of our community. It does not have legitimacy because
it is inherently right about all things. We come to the Constitution
already bound to it, already feeling as if it is ours and desiring that it
enable our full freedom and flourishing as human beings. Most of us, at
least, cannot walk away. So we try to make it better.

316. See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346,
1398 (2006) (“People—including members of topical minorities—do not necessarily have the
rights they think they have. They may be wrong about the rights they have; the majority may be
right.”).

